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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Brief Statement of Problem 
When ..sociologists became interested in the field of de­
velopment and economic change after the Second World War, 
they tried to contribute to solving the problem of why some 
countries are developed and some are not. The discipline, 
however, was not equipped to contribute substantially to an 
area that was totally new to it. The sociologists began to 
borrow themes and use concepts from the founding fathers of 
sociology. They drew on the evolutionism of Spencer and 
Durkheim in explaining process of structural change through 
increasing societal differentiation and complexity. When 
they wanted to explain change in the sphere of values, norms, 
and attitudes, they turned to Max Weber's thesis in "The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism" and his writ­
ing on religion. 
The traditional theory of modernity built on the above 
concepts and themes had been the dominant one in sociology 
of development in the 1960s. These models and theories can 
be described as the end products of the particular histori­
cal process of the West. Applying them to underdeveloped 
countries faces many problems, not only on ideological 
grounds, but also in conceptual misplacement of many of 
these concepts. For that, the sociology of development has 
been attacked ag the underdevelopment of sociology (.Frank, 
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1969b) and many scholars demand that sociology needs to go 
beyond the sociology of development (Oxaal et al., 1975). 
Sociologists realized the shortcomings of their ap­
proach and began to look for alternative frameworks for 
analyzing issues related to development. New paradigms 
came to be recognized with general orientation based on 
assumption concerning the nature of the realities different 
from the traditional sociology of development. The world 
system dependency paradigm's question is, according to the 
reality of underdeveloped countries and the explanations 
this perspective attempted to offer, based on the inter­
national relation of inequality, domination, and dependence. 
Many writers contributed to this paradigm: some are neo-
Marxist and some structuralist-non-Marxist, but they all be­
lieve that the only world system which exists is the capi­
talist world system which consists of two parts, the center 
of which is located in the industrialized West and its 
periphery the underdeveloped countries. It is the last 
approach that has been utilized to study the socioeconomic 
change in Saudi Arabia. 
One of the major contributors to the last perspective 
is Amin, who has refined this perspective and offered an 
elaborate categorical and theoretical model which can be 
utilized as an analytical framework to analyze a concrete 
case. With this model, it is possible to investigate 
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empirically the pattern of social change in developing 
countries. Amin specified the dynamics of capitalist expan­
sion in the peripheral societies. That is different from 
that of dynamism in central capitalism. This specific 
dynamism produced structural features in the underdeveloped 
countries, characterized by syndrome of segmentation. 
Saudi Arabia shares with other developing countries 
many characteristics of underdevelopment. However, the 
uniqueness of Saudi Arabia's development makes it at odds 
with many prevailing developmental theories. Rather than 
reflecting the poverty and instability of other Third World 
societies, Saudi Arabia is a capital-surplus society due to 
wealth derived from oil export. If capital shortage per se 
is not the origin of dependency, and hence underdevelopment, 
can Saudi Arabia be characterized as an underdeveloped and 
dependent nation? Does Saudi Arabia reflect the structural 
characteristics of dependency syndrome? These questions 
and others present a challenge to dependency perspective, 
especially the question of whether autonomous capitalist 
development is possible in a peripheral nation. 
Almost all studies about Saudi Arabia are in the tra­
ditional-modernity type mentioned in the beginning of this 
introduction (Farsy, 1982; Shaker, 1972; El Mallakh, 1982b). 
These studies analyzed change in economic, political, 
social, cultural or in specific processes such as role of 
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women, family, political system, bureaucracy education, 
etc. as countries are advancing from less to more in 
modern and complex forms with the primary explanatory vari­
ables of these changes in increase of income derived from 
oil. To them, underdevelopment is only a minor obstacle 
derived from either the traditional culture or from social 
institution. Other than that, development in the sense of 
modernity is inevitable. This approach failed to explain 
process of continuity and change and the social dynamics 
of reproduction of underdevelopment (Al-Awaji, 1971). 
This study hoped to accomplish two things : 
(1) To explain process of change in Saudi Arabia through 
the utilization of a framework according to world 
system and dependency perspective. 
(2) To contribute to the theoretical development of the 
sociology of development in general and dependency in 
particular. 
The study consists of two parts. Part one contains the 
theoretical discussion. Part two concentrates on empirical 
analysis of the Saudi Arabian case. Chapter I is a general 
introduction of the study that includes historical analysis 
of Saudi Arabia. Chapter II reviews and discusses the 
literature on development and change. Chapter III concen­
trates on Amin's general theory with discussion of his major 
ideas and concepts in addition to comprehensive review of his 
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critics. Chapter IV is the empirical investigation on the 
case study of Saudi Arabia. Chapter V discusses the impli­
cations for the theory and development policy of the case 
under investigation. Finally, Chapter VI presents the 
summary and recommendation for the development policies in 
Saudi Arabia. 
B. History of Saudi Arabia 
Among developing countries, Saudi Arabia is unique. 
Its borders were recently defined, but it was never 
colonized. Therefore, its traditional mode of production 
lasted well into the 20th century, while that of most 
countries of the periphery was destroyed in the 19th century 
(Lackner, 1978). Saudi Arabia "underwent a striking trans­
formation in the decades after 1950. From being an area of 
extreme economic backwardness and of marginal importance to 
the world economy, it became the scene of intense development 
and acquired enormous strategic importance for world capi­
talism" (Halliday, 1974, p. 17). 
"No external power intervened to impose an exogenous 
transformation; peninsular society was arrested by its own 
structures and therefore incapable of internally generating 
change. . . it was only in the twentieth century that 
Arabia's isolation was broken and that the socio-economic 
structure of the area underwent irreversible change" 
(.Halliday, 1974, p. 18). 
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Saudi Arabia occupies about 80 percent of the Arabian 
Peninsula, bordered by Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait to the north, 
the Red Sea and the Yemen Arab Republic to the west, the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Oman to the south, 
the United Arab Emirates and the Gulf Coast to the east. 
The country'covers about 1,400,000 square kilometers, less 
than two percent of which is cultivated, while the rest is 
mainly desert with some areas suitable for occasional graz­
ing. There are no permanent rivers, only wadis which are 
filled with torrents of flood water during the occasional 
rains, but otherwise dry. Wells and occasional springs are 
the other main source of water. Larger springs sometimes 
develop into oases where people can settle permanently and 
live off agriculture. 
1. Mode of production and social formation 
Historically, the peninsula had a subsistence economy; 
but a commercial sector existed that markedly influenced 
the general social condition, especially in the interior of 
the peninsula. Nomadic pastoralism and subsistence agri­
culture in the oases persisted from pre-Islamic times into 
the 20th century. They were means of survival well-adapted 
to the scarcity of resources, and while there were trade 
relations between peasant and nomad, these did not provide 
the basis for transforming the mode of production in the 
interior. 
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The predominant form of social organization was, how­
ever, the tribe. This was a kinship unit, formally based 
on real or imagined descent from a common ancestor through 
the male line. The tribe or its subsection was the unit 
that constituted economic, military and political activity 
among nomads, who constituted approximately 60-80 percent 
of the population, as well as settled community but to a 
lesser degree. 
Inequality operated both within and between tribes. 
The growth of social inequalities accompanying sedentarism 
fostered differences among members of the tribe in power, 
wealth and ownership of the means of production. From the 
most primitive nomadic society onward, some families were 
more privileged than others, either by having more camels 
rather than sheep or by traditionally greater influence 
within the tribe. Tribes were traditionally graded accord­
ing to the stronger and weaker, the richer and the poorer, 
more brave, less brave. Status inequality was more pro­
nounced among nomads than economic inequality, because the 
economic surplus was small. 
The Bedouin Cnomads) lived off their sheep and camels, 
which provided food, clothing, housing materials and trans­
port. The sheep and camels fed off the permanent vegetation 
of oases and off the greenery that sprang up in the desert 
after occasional rains. Individual property rights in land 
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were meaningless for the nomadic communities y for they were 
always traveling through the desert regions in search of 
short-lived grazing, following the rainfall in the winter. 
In summer, they camped near a permanent water hole or an 
oasis where they had relations with the villagers. However, 
tribes and sections of a tribe had identified and recognized 
areas including wells and water holes, that were considered 
to be theirs. The delimitation of these areas was somewhat 
flexible and changed according to grazing condition and 
agreement between tribes. Frequently, there was no agreement 
and the use of another group's land led to inter-tribal con­
flict. Fighting sometimes took the form of camel stealing 
as a means of survival or as bride wealth, or for sale to 
neighboring regions. Raids and counter-raids for camels 
were part of the basic economic and political life of the 
desert as an expression of the continuous struggle for 
existence. 
In the settled southern part of the peninsula and in 
the oases of Najd and al Hasa, the people grew cereals and 
dates. Dates were the basis of life, the staple of human 
diet, and were the only product grown in sufficient quanti­
ties to be traded outside the oasis community. Few vege­
tables and grain were grown, especially in the Tihama Plain 
in the west and in the hills of Asir (.see Figure 1) . Since 
this region received monsoon rainfall, crops could be 
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Figure 1. Map of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
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cultivated without irrigation. 
Land was mainly owned by families who worked on it 
themselves or other peasants who worked on the land in re­
turn for a percentage of the crop (sharecropping). Large 
landowners who employed farm laborers on a permanent basis 
were rare. Small family,plots tended to be divided to a 
point below economic viability by the inheritance system. 
Inequalities in the ownership of the land and date palms, 
as well as of access to water, created inequalities between 
the families in the peasant communities. The economically 
dominant family tended to dominate the council of elders^ 
who decided the common affairs of the community, but the 
low level of economic resources limited the degree of in­
equality, leaving rich and poor on familiar terms. 
Both nomadic and settled people practiced trade, of 
which there were three distinct varieties. The first was 
intra-peninsular exchange among different economic sectors; 
nomads traded animal products, e.g. milk products, skins, 
etc. for peasant crops and for products of the small artisan 
community in the towns. The second kind of trade involved 
the exchange of peninsular products for imported goods such 
as gold and the manufactured products and clothes from the 
countries in the north. The exported products were camels, 
^The Council of Notables consists mostly of the elders 
of merchant families to decide the affairs of the towns and 
cities. 
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horses, and dates. Lorimer (1976) describes the thriving 
export of dates from Bahrain at the turn of the century as 
based almost exclusively on dates brought from eastern 
Arabia (al-Hasa), and points to Najd (central part of the 
Peninsula) as being the only area in the world where the 
Arabian horse was bred for export in substantial numbers: 
Najd or Central Arabia is the principal horse-
breeding country in the Persian Gulf and the 
only one in the world . . . where the genuine 
Arab is produced on any considerable scale. 
Horses are most numerous in north central 
Arabia . . . but the export trade depends 
largely on the more central district of Qasin 
where the towns of 'Anaizah and Buraidah are 
the principal markets. 'Anaizah, supplied 
principally by the Qahtan, furnishes as a rule 
animals of higher caste, while at Buraidah, 
provided chiefly by the Mutair, the number of 
animals is usually larger. (Lorimer, 1976, p. 
2247) 
Trade activities associated with camels were also sig­
nificant. Their breeding for export constituted a fairly 
widespread economic pursuit (Lorimer, 1976). 
The third form of exchange, which is the camel-borne 
trade crossing the Peninsula from the Gulf ports and Yemen 
to Syria and back, was of considerable importance to the 
economy of central Arabia. Although some of this trade did 
not originate in the Peninsula but between India, China and 
Africa on the southeast and southwest, it benefitted the 
merchants of Jihaz in Mecca and later to Jiddah. The well-
known caravan route between Yemen and Mecca in the winter 
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and between Mecca and Syria in the summer had their origin 
in antiquity. The rise of Islam increased the importance 
of the towns. These towns (Mecca and Medina) were not 
merely market towns, but religious centers, and the old 
trade routes became pilgrim trails. The revenue obtained 
from pilgrims was of major importance to these towns. 
The commercial networks in Hejaz (western part of Saudi 
Arabia) were well-known for hundreds of years. Similarly, 
the well-established trade in the Najd area (central part of 
Saudi Arabia) is to be found in the works of Charles Doughty 
(1920) , who estimated that in the late 1870s, one-third of 
the population of the al-Qasim province was involved in the 
caravan trade. John Philby (1955), writing in the 1920s, 
described the thriving commercial sector in Shagra north of 
Riyad, and referred to the commercial contracts which Shagra 
merchants maintained with their agents in the Gulf ports of 
Iraq and India. In the early years of the century, the town 
of Zubeir in southern Iraq was inhabited predominantly by 
Najdi merchants engaged in handling trade between Central 
Arabia and the outside world (Almana, 1980). Trade had 
become a necessity for the settled population of Central 
Arabia. The wheat crop was insufficient for the needs of 
the population and cereal imports were required, including 
rice which was increasingly becoming the stable diet of the 
well-to-do, and clothing which the settled population 
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depended almost entirely on from overseas sources (Philby, 
1955; Armstrong, 1934; Rihani, 1928). 
The surplus which was accrued to the town merchants 
through trade and from the pilgrims, with the spread of 
Islam, was not used to develop the productive forces of the 
Peninsula. There were few urban populations. Nomads and 
the oases people were affected by changes in the forms and 
amount of trade and the revenue coming in with pilgrims, 
but it was only in the towns that the degree of dependency 
on trade relations and pilgrim taxation was crucial. The 
Peninsula under these conditions was not a unified society; 
the tribal structure and divided oasis, desert and urban 
communities, the degree of isolation from each other, and 
the mode of production made the presence of a unified social 
and political structure impossible. Unification could arise 
only by the destruction of the old forms and the integration 
of the desert and oasis people into a single economy 
transcending simple trade relations. This process occurred 
in the 20th century under political pressures from the out­
side world. The creation of a common political structure 
for the whole region followed the discovery of oil. The 
economic effects of these resources throughout the Peninsula 
made the centralization of state power both a possibility 
and a necessity. 
Tim Niblock (.1982) pointed out that the substantial 
f 
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and growing importance of commerce in central Arabia at the 
time of the creation of the Saudi state indicated the role 
commercial interests played in the creation and expansion 
of the state. The commercial centers required settled 
conditions, where communications were free of disputes 
between local rurals and bedouin tribes, and where the safe­
ty and security of the trade routes could be guaranteed 
(Niblock, 1982). He asserted that the commercial sector 
constituted the principal instrument through which Saudi 
Arabia was increasingly drawn into the economy of the capi­
talist world, until the oil sector assumed these roles 
(Niblock, 1982, p. 95). 
2. Political superstructure 
The process of unification of Saudi Arabia took place 
in conditions new to the Peninsula. In the struggle between 
the tribes to dominate the region, alliances were a major 
factor, particularly those with the British or the Ottomans. 
In the first 30 years of the 20th century, the area was 
finally united into a single political unit, culminating in 
the proclamation in 1934 of Abdel-Aziz al Saud as King of 
Saudi Arabia, thus introducing the concept of monarchy into 
a formerly tribal structure (.Lackner, 1978) . 
The modern Saudi state has its origins in the 18th 
century, when Mohammad Abdel Wahhab C1703t-1792) started 
preaching for the return to the basic principles of Islam 
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and excluded all the pre-Islamic ritual and beliefs Islam 
had absorbed. He stressed the "oneness" of God, opposing 
the worship of holy places and excessive veneration of 
Mohammad. He called for the firm practice of Islamic legal 
punishments, based on the Koran, the Sunni law school, and 
the six books of tradition which were adopted during the 
first three centuries of Islam. 
Mohammad found support from the ruler, Mohammad ben 
Saud, of a small town in Najd called Dar'iya. This was to 
be a long-lasting and successful alliance in which A1 Saud 
committed himself to be the temporal defender of the Wahhabi 
doctrine. Under the banner of this movement, the Saudi-led 
tribes conquered a large part of the Peninsula in the 18th 
and early 19th centuries. 
A series of campaigns launched against the Saudi forces 
in 1811 by the powers to the north and northeast, armies 
from Egypt (under Mohammad Ali) and from the Ottoman Empire, 
drove the Saudi forces out of western Arabia. By 1814, the 
Egyptians were finally in control of the Hajaz and, in 1818, 
Al Baud's capital Dar'iya was totally destroyed. When the 
Egyptians left, local rivalries between petty rulers developed 
throughout the region to dominate Najd. By 1840, Turki Al 
Saud regained the power in Najd. His son Faisal succeeded 
him after Turki's assassination. Faisal's expansion brought 
back the Egyptians, who reasserted control in the late 1840s. 
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Mohammad All's death in 1847 ended all direct Ottoman and 
Egyptian interference in the heart of the Peninsula. After 
Faisal's death in 1865, the Saudi family lost control, due 
to internal fights over succession. A rival family, the 
Al Rashid from Shammer tribe, took advantage to win the 
control of Najd while sending the remaining Al Saud into 
exile in Kuwait. By the turn of the century, Najd was 
under the control of the Al Rashid; al Hasa and the Hijaz 
were under Ottoman control, and the surrounding Gulf states 
were under British control. 
In 1902, the beginning of the building of the Saudi 
Kingdom, Abdel Aziz, with the backing of the ruler of 
Kuwait, led forty of his family and followers on an attack 
on Riyad, the capital of Najd, and recaptured it from Ibn 
Rashid. By 1906, the whole of Najd were under the control 
of Abdel Aziz. In 1913, Al Haza, the eastern region, then 
under Turkish control, also came under Al Saud control. 
By January of 1926, Abdel Aziz was proclaimed king of Hejaz. 
In 1932, he announced that the whole of his territory had 
been united under a new name, Saudi Arabia. 
The source of income to Abdel Aziz to keep the military 
operation of unification going, and to win the loyalty of 
nomads, came mainly from the merchants of the towns, either 
as taxes or short term lendings. The surplus was little 
because of the relatively underdeveloped economic system in 
17 
Najd. After the conquest of Hejaz, the income was mainly 
"beside the Pilgrimage, the King's most lucrative source 
of income has been the Jeddah group of merchants" (Rashid, 
1980, p. 30). 
Table 1. Government revenue, 1902-47 (Philby, 1955) 
Year 
Approximate annual 
government revenue 
(in £) 
1902-12 50 
1913-25 100,000 
1926-37 4-5 million 
1938-46 5-6 million 
1947-48 21.5 million 
Until 1947, this pattern of political and 
economic organization was conducive to a certain 
equilibrium; although some merchants, together 
with some of those wielding political power or 
influence, no doubt grew richer, the country's 
social structure underwent no radical transforma­
tion. (Philby, 1955, p. 338) 
In 1933, Ibn Saud had to face a severe financial crisis 
because his main source of income, taxation of Hujaj (.Muslim 
pilgrims) had been undermined by the world slump; for 50,000 
in gold, he gave an oil concession to Standard Oil of Cali­
fornia (SOCAL). SOCAL later merged with three other U.S. 
firms (ESSO, Texaco, Mobil) to form the Arabian American 
Oil Company (ARAMCO). Tanzel noted that 
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For this- amount. Standard of California got a 
sixty-year concession for all of Saudi Arabia's 
oil—a far better bargain than even the fabled 
deal giving the American Indians $24 for Manhattan 
Island. By 1936, Saudi Arabia looked so promising 
that (SOCAL), which had no outlets for vast quanti­
ties of crude oil, sold a halfshare of its Bahrein 
and Saudi properties to Texaco for $3 million 
down and $18 million out of future earnings. 
(Tanzer, 1974, p. 45) 
The area of the concession exceeded 350,000 square miles. 
The company was given the exclusive right to 
Explore, prospect, drill for, extract, manufac­
ture, transport and export all oil produced. . . . 
The company agreed to build a refinery; supply 
the government with 200,000 gallons of gasoline 
and 100,000 gallons of kerosene yearly; and 
advance loans deductible from future royalties, 
which were fixed at 4 gold shillings per ton of 
crude oil. (Walpole et al., 1971, pp. 244-5) 
Oil was discovered in commercial quantities in 1938 and 
production began on a small scale the same year. In May 
1939, the first tanker was loaded to export oil. The sub­
stantial influx of oil revenues into the structure described 
earlier brought about significant changes in the relative 
prosperity and well-being of different sections of Saudi 
Arabia's population. The effect of oil revenues on the 
country's social structure was to substantially widen exist­
ing inequalities. While the commercial sector benefitted 
greatly from the boom in consumer demands, and from the in­
creased resources available to finance imports, the rising 
imports virtually destroyed the handicraft sector of the 
economy and seriously affected the agricultural and pastoral 
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sectors (see Chapter IV). The development of bourgeoisie 
is closely linked to its integration into the capitalist 
system. They developed in the sectors that are linked to 
integration into the world system such as commerce, finance, 
transport, and construction. The role of the bourgeoisie 
is merely intermediary rather than actively contributing 
to industry. 
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II. THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 
From the 16th to the 19th century, a complex set of 
changes occurred in Western Europe. At some point in this 
period, a chain of events began which was to produce con­
temporary capitalistic industrialization. The shape of the 
world was to be radically transformed. The attempt to 
understand the nature of the transition, and to come to grips 
with it, gave rise to that distinctive corpus of social 
thought which has evolved into modern sociology. The dif­
ferent strands of that body of thought produced fundamental­
ly different accounts of what had happened. And when 
sociologists did turn their attention to the underdeveloped 
world, many of them drew back on that experience of the West 
to explain what was going on in the underdeveloped nations. 
The major viewpoints of the sociology of development can be 
organized into three perspectives. 
A. Evolution to Social Differentiation 
Borrowing from the biological sciences, the concept of 
development was applied to the continuous transformations 
experienced by human society as a growing organism which 
passed through a series of ordered and inevitable stages, 
for example, from savagery through barbarism to civiliza­
tion. Such stages culminated in the highest level of social 
complexity, represented by advanced European nations. 
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Theories of Morgan, Comte, Hobhouse, Spencer, Kidd and Word 
represented this viewpoint in the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Bogardus (1940), White (1959), and Steward 
(1955) are the modern anthropological proponents of the 
evolutionary perspective of culture. 
All these theories of social evolution were an attempt 
to discover the general trends in the development of all 
human societies, which led to the formulation of a series 
of stages of development with the assumption of its uni­
versality and unilinearity and the notion of a simple se­
quence of stages through which all societies pass. The prob­
lem concerns the mechanism which shifts a society from one 
evolutionary stage to another. What is this mechanism, and 
how does it operate? As Eisenstadt has noted, "The first 
crucial problem concerns the extent to which change from one 
type of society to another is not accidental or random but, 
rather, evinces over-all evolutionary or developmental 
trends" (Eisenstadt, 1968, p. 228). With these problems, 
theories of social evolution have lost their popularity in 
recent years. 
However, despite the obvious problems with evolution­
ary theory, watered-down versions exist in the form of 
theories of "stages of growth" and developmental or modern­
ization theory in general, and the notion of social differ­
entiation and "evolutionary universais." 
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The most widespread notion was the dichotomy "tradition­
al" versus "modern." The assumption was that all societies 
were alike at one stage, in that they were "traditional," 
and that eventually they would also pass through the same 
set of changes as had happened in the West, and become 
"modern." 
Their theories necessarily adopted a "before and after" 
model, in which beginning and end stages were described in 
different terms and with different value tonalities (Bendix, 
1967). 
But it is inaccurate to assume that pre-industrial 
societies are alike. There is a wide range of social struc­
ture among them, and there is no reason to assume that the 
dynamics of change are the same in feudal societies as they 
are in tribal societies or bureaucratic empires. In addi­
tion, the use of the word "traditional" conveys a false 
image of static equilibrium. 
Several sociologists have taken this bipolar approach 
to social change, such as Ferdinand Toennies (1957). He 
described the trend from what he calls Gemeinschaft to 
Gesellschaft as one in which small, primitive, traditional, 
homogeneous, closely-knit communities are eradicated and 
replaced by large, urbanized, industrial societies where 
human relations are impersonal, formal, contractual, utili­
tarian, realistic, and specialisted. Durkheim (1947) 
I 
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argued that when division of labor increases as a result 
of population expansion, then the qualitative character of 
social life changes from one reflecting a "mechanical" form 
of social cohesion to one reflecting an "organic" form of 
social cohesion. Howard P. Becker (1950) saw the transi­
tion as being from a "sacred," traditionally oriented 
society to a "secular" society that evaluates customs 
and practices in terms of their pragmatic outcomes. Henry 
Main (1870) contrasted the societies based on status 
and those based on contract. In anthropology, Robert 
Redfield (1941) put the transition as being from "folk" 
to "urban" (folk-urban continuum). Change happened as 
the consequence of an "increase of contracts bringing about 
heterogeneity and disorganization of culture" (Redfield, 
1941, p. 369) . Cooley (1962) distinguished between 
"primary" and "secondary" social attachments. D. Lerner 
(1965), Levy (1966), Inkles and Smith (1974), and W. Moore 
(19 74) from the contemporary theorized on differences be­
tween "tradition" and "modernity." Some theorists elabor­
ated the dichotomy in a more sophisticated way. Talcott 
Parsons had developed his five pairs of pattern-variables. 
Bert Hoselitz (.1960) attempted to use pattern-variables to 
describe the places of development and locate society along 
these dichotomies. He argues that developed countries are 
characterized by universalism, achievement orientation 
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functional specificity, and underdeveloped countries by the 
opposite variables of particularism, ascription, and func­
tional diffuseness. Hoselitz conceptualizes the change 
from a traditional to modern society as entailing the even­
tual modification or elimination of "traditional" pattern 
variables. The validity of the assumption of a traditional-
modern dichotomy has been criticized by many writers. A. G. 
Frank has shown in detail that even if one accepts Parson's 
pattern-variables as a useful analytic tool, whether one 
could apply them in a straightforward way to contrast under­
developed and developed societies is quite dubious (Frank, 
1969b). He argues that even within the terms of their own 
theoretical framework, the Parsonians are confronted with 
negative evidence. It is by no means clear that developed 
societies are, in fact, predominantly organized in terms of 
"modern" pattern-variables nor that underdeveloped societies 
are organized in terms of "traditional" pattern-variables. 
But even if one accepts the Parsonian contention that these 
sets of pattern-variables do accurately describe a bipolar 
situation, the validity of such dichotomy is itself open to 
question (Frank, 1969b). 
Social differentiation is another concept emerging from 
evolutionary theory and its counterpart the structural func-
tionalism. Despite Spencer's adoption of the word "func­
tion," the first systematic formulation of the logic of a 
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structural-functional approach in sociology can be found 
in the works of Emile Durkheim. In the division of labor 
in society, he makes a clear distinction between the func­
tion of the division of labor and its efficient cause. Its 
basic function is the integration of society; its cause 
was the increase in "moral density" induced by population 
pressure. Function, for Durkheim, is a contribution to the 
maintenance of social life and society, as can be seen fur­
ther in his discussions of the social significance of 
religion, punishment, and ceremony. Increased differentia­
tion and specialization are seen as a response to pressure 
from population increase that creates problems of integra­
tion which can be solved by emerging networks of inter­
dependence. 
Based on the idea of structural differentiation, Neil 
Smelser (1966) stated that a developed economy and society 
is characterized as a highly differentiated structure and 
an underdeveloped one as relatively lacking in differentia­
tion; hence, change centers on the process of differentia­
tion itself. By "differentiation," Smelser means the 
process by which more specialized and more autonomous social 
units are established. This he sees occurring in several 
different spheres; in the economy, the family, the politi­
cal system, and religious institutions. 
The process of integration takes place whereby these 
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differentiated structures are united on a new basis. This 
denotes, for example, the move from a "pre-modern" political 
structure, where political integration is closely bound up 
with kinship status, tribal membership, and control of basic 
economic resources and of mystical sanctions, to a "modern" 
type political structure characterized by the existence of 
specialized political parties, pressure groups, and a state 
bureaucracy. 
Change is conceived by Smelser (196 6) as transformation 
by means of the differentiation process. "Development pro­
ceeds through various stages of specialization and differen­
tiation" (Eisenstadt, 1964). 
To sum up the major themes of these theories, these 
theorists see development as gradual qualitative passage from 
less to more differentiated social forms through more complex 
specialization and functional interdependence. And social 
roles are transformed to approach modern standard of uni-
versalism, specificity, and achievement. With development, 
certain adoptive features are incorporated to insure the 
survival of the system. 
In common, these theories rest on the idea of unilinear 
development along the lines of what appears to have happened 
in Western European capitalist countries. They are rather 
an idealization of the main direction of certain social and 
cultural trends that proved so successful in the West (Smith, 
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1973, p. 87). To extrapolate from an understanding of a 
particular historical sequence of Western Europe and posit 
the existence of similar structural processes arising under 
conditions of economic growth in the developing world can 
be seen as ethnocentric. 
Theories or models based on the experience of Western 
economic development are probably largely irrelevant to 
comprehending the kinds of processes occurring in present-
day developing countries whose socio-historical and con­
temporary circumstances are so different. 
The assumption of this paradigm is that the process of 
social change is essentially endogenous is clearly inadmissi­
ble for the countries of the Third World. To conceive socie­
ties as autonomous units that change according to internal 
forces is misleading. In the Third World, the process of 
rapid social change occurred, in fact, as a direct result of 
the expansion of the West, and most of the processes of 
change which have occurred in these societies have been in 
direct response to the impact of the Western system. Con­
temporary development is not a matter of autonomous change 
but one composed largely of exchange and confrontation in an 
integrated world-system in order to alter the position of 
individual nations (Wallerstein, 1974b). 
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B. Social-Psychological Theories of Development 
The underlying assumption of this school of thought is 
that societies develop as a result of the workings of certain 
psychological factors. Where such factors are present, 
development will take place; where they are absent, stagna­
tion will prevail. The existence of certain "modern" atti­
tudes is a precondition to development (Hoselitz, 1960; 
McClelland et al., 1961; Hagen, 1962; Inkles and Smith, 1974; 
Lerner, 1965). They believe that attitudinal and value 
changes are essential prerequisites to creating a modern 
society and economy, and a political system (Weiner, 1966). 
Instead of concentrating on technological and environ­
mental factors, structural constraints, or external condi­
tions, this attitude approach focuses on individuals and 
their personality attributes. It deals with psychological 
determinants that derive people to act, to invent, to dis­
cover, and to create. 
The intellectual origin of this paradigm can be traced 
to Max Weber in his writing on "The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism" (.1958) . Weber saw the development of 
modern industrial capitalism as a product of rationalization 
resulted from the spread of the Protestant ethic. "Develop­
ment of the spirit of capitalism is best understood as part 
of the development of rationalism on the basic problem of 
life" (Weber, 1958, p. 76). He drew the distinction between 
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traditional and rational social values when characterizing 
the contrast between feudalism and capitalism. Traditional­
ism in economic behavior for Weber meant "fixation on an 
immutable standard of concrete preference" with established 
ways of attaining them, whereas rationality entailed a con­
tinual weighing of preferences, in terms of relative cost of 
attaining each and according to the criteria of technical 
efficiency. To Calvinist believers, rationality and calcu­
lation were means to salvation in the next world as well as 
in this one. "The God of Calvinism demanded of his believ­
ers not single good works, but a life of good works combined 
into a unified system" (Weber, 1958, p. 117). Weber argued 
this theological doctrine produced intense anxiety among the 
Calvinists and that, to reduce this anxiety and reassure 
themselves that they were, in fact, to be numbered among the 
elect, they attempted to behave as though they had indeed 
been called. This meant a systematic ordering of their 
daily life, including their economic pursuits, in a rational 
manner, which led to rapid economic advance, and capital 
accumulation that produced the development of modern in­
dustrial society of Western Europe. 
For McClelland, "The psychological forces that deter­
mined ultimately the rate of economic and social development 
is what he called n-Ach (.need for achievement)." He asserts 
that the greater the development of n achievement, the more 
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likely that economic development will be intense. Need 
achievement, argues McClelland, means "a strong desire for 
achievement, for doing a good job" (McClelland, 1973, p. 
162) . 
Achievement motivation can be learned through education 
and child-rearing practices that emphasize such values as 
self-reliance, high praise for hard work, persistence in goal 
attainment, and interest in excellence for its own sake. 
These can be an instrument in creating a foundation for a 
strong n achievement. 
Like McClelland, E. Hagen (1962) is concerned with fac­
tors of personality that transform a traditional society in­
to one that undergoes technological progress and economic 
growth. Technological progress is considered to be a power­
ful force that disturbs equilibrium of traditional society. 
Hagen argues that traditional societies lack creative 
and innovative personalities because the relationship between 
social groups is "authoritarian." Interpersonal relations 
are solved on the basis of "ascriptive authority," and people 
avoid anxiety by resorting to authority. Such types of 
society have a great deal of stability in their institution, 
and there may be no social change for centuries. Since "the 
interrelationships between personality and social structure 
are such as to make it clear that social change will not 
occur without change in personality" (.Hagen, 1962, p. 86). 
! 
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How is traditional society transformed into one in which 
creative personalities are produced and developed to carry 
on economic progress? 
Hagen argues that change came about when members of one 
social group perceived that their purposes and values were 
not respected by groups in the society whom they respected 
and whose esteem they valued. He calls it "withdrawal of 
status respect." Several situations of status withdrawal, 
for example, when a traditional elite group is replaced by 
another group, or the nonacceptance of a migrant group in a 
new place of residence, etc. Withdrawal of status respect 
at first produces apathy, social retreat, and other forms of 
disorganization. But these developments may give rise to 
innovative and creative entrepreneurs. These stages of 
change are determined by varying patterns of child treatment 
and the ways that children react to this treatment by their 
parents through successive generations. 
Theories of "modernity" look at the psychological com­
plex of values (Lerner, 1965; Inkles and Smith, 1974; Kahl, 
1968; Schnaiberg, 1970). "Modern man" is characterized in­
ternally by a certain mental flexibility in dealing with new 
situations and externally by similarity to the value orienta­
tions dominant in industrial Western society (.Lerner, 1965) . 
These writers regard modernity as a precondition for social 
modernization and as a major consequence of it. Development 
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means the change in attitude and behavior, a transformation 
in the very nature of man. This transformation is the shift 
from traditionalism to individual modernity. Men become 
modern through the particular life experience they undergo, 
such as school, factory urban environment, and mass media. 
Lerner defines "modernity" as the state of mind-
expectation of progress, propensity to growth, readiness to 
adapt oneself to change. Modernity of individuals is in sum 
the psychological transformation through empathie capacity. 
To Lerner, "empathy," mobile personality, is the predominant 
personal style only in modern society that is distinctively 
industrial, urban, literate, and participant (Lerner, 1965). 
Inkles and Smith (1974) think that more modern social 
conditions lead to more of the following characteristics in 
individuals; openness to new experiences and to new ways of 
doing things, readiness for change (acceptance of changed 
opportunities, greater willingness to allow others to do 
things in new ways), being disposed to form and hold openism 
on a large number of issues that arise within and outside 
one's immediate environment, being aware of the diversity of 
attitudes and opinions around one and valuing these varia­
tions in opinion, being informed about the wider world, being 
oriented to the present or the future rather than the past, 
believing that people can learn to exert considerable control 
over the environment, that they can better arrange human 
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affairs and that they can participate personally in this 
redesign of conditions affecting their own lives (Inkles 
and Smith, 1974). No single quality could adequately define 
the modern man, so they believe that individual modernity 
manifests itself in a variety of forms and contexts, as a 
syndrome or complex of qualities rather than as a single 
trait. Theorists of this persuasion vie with each other in 
developing ever more elaborate description of what modern man 
is like, so they tend to contradict one another. 
This school of thought has been criticized as histori­
cally incorrect, theoretically oversimplified, and method­
ologically flawed. "In fact, motivational theories have 
recently fallen into relative disfavor and investigators have 
turned to other questions concerning the supply of entre-
preneurship" (Smelser, 1976, p. 128). 
Some of the criticism deals with the fact that this 
approach neglects the international economic and political 
linkages as well as paying little attention to structural 
constraints. 
G. Frank states that "those engaging in this mode of 
analysis resolutely avoid the study of the international 
structure of development and underdevelopment of which the 
domestic structure of underdevelopment is only a part" 
(Frank, 1969b, p. 47). 
Societies are not the simple sum of individual members. 
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Motivated individuals and highly modernized personalities 
must cope with existing economic, social and political 
arrangements. Highly motivated modern individuals can be 
extremely functional for maintenance of existing power struc­
ture. The motivation for achievement of individuals can be 
absorbed and fulfilled without changing a basic situation 
of economic subordination and maldistribution. "Bourgeoisie 
of the underdeveloped countries sought nothing but accommoda­
tion to the prevailing order. Living in societies based in 
privilege, they strove for a share in the existing sinecures" 
(Paul Baran, 1970, p. 287). 
The assumption in this paradigm that traditional or 
religious values are obstacles to development has been dis­
puted by a growing body of evidence that shows that so-called 
traditional values are congruent with development and often 
furnish value legitimation necessary in periods of rapid 
national change (Bellah, 1965; Nash, 1958; Walton and 
Portes, 1976; Geertz, 1963). 
The basic methodological problem with neo-Weberian 
approach to understanding factors facilitating modernity is 
that it tends to assume a common end-state such as a capi­
talist, liberal-democratic system or another. One should 
recognize that there are many varied outcomes to economic 
growth and different modes of organizing the pattern of 
development. 
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C. Theories of Dependency School 
This perspective is the newest on sociology of develop­
ment and originated outside Western Europe and the U.S. The 
central premise of the dependency theories is that it is 
impossible to comprehend the processes and problems of de­
velopment in the "Third World" without treating this within 
the wider socio-historical context of the expansion of 
Western European industrial capitalism. It is argued that 
rapid industrial growth in the West could not have occurred 
without the conditioning of a "periphery" from which an 
economic surplus is extracted and necessary raw materials 
secured (Wallerstein, 1974b). From the point of view of 
dependency theories, it is necessary to treat the world as 
one single system. With this as the starting point, the 
problem is to discover the manner in which the "underde­
veloped" countries are inserted into this world system, and 
how this differentiated them from the historical pattern of 
development of the advanced nations. To assume that the 
processes of social change are endogenous to the societies 
of the "Third World" is completely ahistorical. Theories of 
dependency as the counterpart of earlier theories of imperi­
alism (.Lenin, 1939; Hob s on, 1965) or as the observe side of 
them (.Bodenheimer, 1970) . In this sense, dependency theories 
seek to explain the social and economic process occurring in 
the dependent countries, while theories of imperialism 
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focused on the process occurring in the developed countries. 
For example, Hobson argued that there was insufficient 
effective demand in the metropolis, owing to low wages and 
that consequently, capitalists needed to find markets for 
their commodities overseas. He believed that income re­
distribution would remedy this problem of underconsumption. 
Lenin's argument was that the declining rate of profit in the 
metropolis meant that, with the opening up of the colonies, 
there were, more profitable investment opportunities abroad. 
He claimed that imperialism was the highest stage of capi­
talism which is characterized by five features: (1) The 
dominance of monopolies; (2) the dominance of finance capi­
tal; (3) the export of capital—rather than export of com­
modities; (4) the formation of international monopolies; and 
(5) the partition of the world between the various imperial­
ist powers (Lenin, 1939). 
Earlier writings of dependency such as Baran (.1956) 
attributed the economic backwardness of the "Third World" 
to its dependent status in an international market system 
that favors the industrialized countries who control the 
capital, technology and markets essential for economic 
growth. Baran argued that advanced industrial nations of 
the West are opposed to the industrialization of the under­
developed countries since the latter provides them with raw 
materials and investment outlets (.Baran, 1957) . 
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However, dependency theories can be divided into two 
approaches, one conceptualizing dependency as the dependence 
of one system on another which can be labelled external de­
pendency or dependency as a relationship. Dependency is 
seen as purely economic relation between two national 
economies, in which economic development of the dependent na­
tions was conditioned by the economic development of the 
metropolitan nations. Dependency here means lack of 
autonomy, 
The other approach views dependency as a conditioning 
factor which alters the internal functioning and articulation 
of the elements of the dependent social formation. The in­
ternal dynamics of the dependent social formation are seen 
by this approach as fundamentally different from the internal 
dynamics of the social formation of advanced capitalism (see 
Amin, 1976b). 
Quijano (1974) criticized this approach as to 
have no other function than to replace, for cer­
tain purposes, the concept of "imperialism" with­
out providing the necessary understanding of how 
the articulation of elements produced by imperial­
ist domination, giving rise to a determinate socio­
economic formation subordinated to it, is carried 
out. (Quijano, 1974, pp. 398-399) 
To the second approach, Frank (1969b) , Amin (.1976b) , 
and Dos Santos (1970) belong. Dos Santos defines dependency 
as 
a situation in which a certain group of countries 
have their economies conditioned by the development 
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and expansion of another economy, to which their 
own is subjected (where) dependency conditions, a 
certain internal structure which redefines it as 
a function of the structural possibilities of the 
distinct national economies. (Dos Santos, 1970, 
p. 48) 
Andre Gunder Frank (1959a) utilized a whole chain of 
exploitative relations and an extraction and transmission of 
surplus through a series of metropolis-satellite links 
which runs from the world metropolis down to 
the hacienda or rural merchant who are satel­
lites of the local commercial metropolitan 
center but who in their turn have peasants as 
their satellites. (Frank, 1969a, pp. 146-147) 
The close economic, political, social, and cultural ties bind 
the satellite to each metropolis, which expropriates their 
economic surplus to use for its own economic development, 
while the satellites tend to become progressively more de­
pendent. Ties of economic dependence are matched by a con­
centration of political power and social resources in 
metropolitan centers. The small urban-based elite who con­
trol the economic and political life of the masses is the 
manifestation of this notion of concentration which is an 
essential element of the capitalist system. This economic 
and socio-political connection, between satellite and 
metropolis, generates increasing interdependence of their 
bourgeoisie who develop mutual interest in maintaining the 
system. 
This approach does not assume a unifomity among non-
capitalists, so-called "traditional" societies, and allows 
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for the incorporation of dissimilar social structures, e.g. 
tribal, feudal, or peasant type. Rather, it maintains that 
the penetration of capitalism tends to produce change in 
the existing system such that features that are incompatible 
with the newly evolving structure are eventually eliminated. 
However, there are continuing arguments among dependency 
theorists about the definition of capitalism and whether 
there can be a coexistence of more than one mode of produc­
tion in peripheral societies. 
Frank's analysis assumes that the intrusion of capital­
ism leads to the elimination of noncapitalist forms of 
organization. He indicated that the sectors of an under­
developed economy are in fact well-integrated in terms of a 
structured metropolitan-satellite relationship which results 
from the penetration of capitalism into even the remotest 
corners of the "Third World." Frank's social theory has been 
formulated as a conflation of spatial entities and social 
classes (Booth, 1975, p. 78). This conflation and the use 
of a concept of surplus to replace the Marxist concept of 
surplus-value that enables Frank to encompass relations of 
exploitation among social classes and relations of transfer 
of value between economic regions. Frank, however, rejects 
social and economic dualism, and at the same time refuses to 
allow for the persistence of certain feudal-type relations 
or other noncapitalist modes as Frank's claim that Latin 
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America has been a capitalist society since the beginning of 
the 16th century. 
Ernest Laclau (1971) argues that Frank's definition of 
capitalism differs radically from the Marxist one since it 
emphasizes exchange and commercial relationships rather than 
the processes of production. Frank confuses participation 
in the world capitalist economic system with the dominance 
of the capitalist mode of production in Latin America. 
Drawing on Marx, Laclau stresses the necessity of dis­
tinguishing between capital and capitalism. He said, 
Did the structural conditions of capitalist exist 
in 16th century Europe when, according to Frank, 
the process of capital domination started in 
Latin America? Could we consider free labor to 
be the rule then? By no means. Feudal dependence 
and urban handicrafts remained the basic forms of 
productive activity. The existence of a powerful 
commercial class which greatly enlarged its stock 
of capital through overseas trade did not in the 
least modify the decisive fact that this capital 
was accumulated by the absorption of an economic 
surplus produced through labor relationships very 
different from those of free labor. (Laclau, 
1971, p. 27) 
The debate among theorists over the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism in Western Europe and what defines 
the characteristics of feudalism carried on for many years. 
Some of them characterize feudalism as the absence of large-
scale commerce, the self-sufficiency of manor and production 
for use rather than for exchange (Hilton, 1976). If the 
dominant role of production is for the market, then it is 
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capitalism. This is the position of Frank as well as 
Wallerstein. However, for Marxists, it is not the produc­
tion of commodities as such which defines the capitalist 
mode of production, but rather the existence of labor-power 
as a commodity, and it is not the absence of markets but 
the existence of servile labor that defines feudalism as a 
mode.of production. 
The discussion of modes of production in the developing 
countries is concerned with the ways in which the capitalist 
mode articulates with, and eventually comes to have control­
ling influence over, noncapitalist modes. The criticism 
of Frank's thesis by Laclau (1971) and the work by the 
French Marxist anthropologists such as Terray (1972) and 
Dupre and Rey (1973) represent an attempt to come to grips 
with multistructural character of economic systems in the 
developing countries through an analysis of production 
system. Through this analysis, sociologists and anthro­
pologists hope to gain insight into the mechanisms by which 
particular types of production relations are maintained and 
how they are connected with other modes existing within the 
same macro socio-economic framework. This approach aims to 
explain how and why certain noncapitalist forms of produc­
tion persist despite their involvement in modern marketing 
systems based on commodity exchange. While Frank is right 
in emphasizing the importance of exchange processes, it is 
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equally important to attempt to relate patterns of circula­
tion and distribution to production. 
The argument of this perspective stated that the mode 
of articulation of the underdeveloped economies with the 
world economic system may result in a transfer of resources 
from the periphery to the center and/or this articulation 
may give rise to various blocking mechanisms which hold 
back or distort the economies of the periphery, thereby pre­
venting an allocation of resources which will produce 
economic growth. Value may be transferred through unequal 
exchange, through the exchange of productive goods for non­
productive goods or through control over prices, etc. 
In the dependent countries, there are different aspects 
of articulation. Within the social formation of the de­
pendent country, there is the articulation of the modes of 
production in the interior where capitalism is the dominant 
mode of production. At the level of its interconnection 
with the world economy, there is the articulation between 
dependent social formation in the periphery and pure capi­
talism in the center (Amin, 1976b). The two aspects are 
interrelated. The manner in which the economy is inserted 
into the world economy conditions the processes of articula­
tion of modes of production within the social formation of 
the dependent countries. 
Marx's discussion of the primitive accumulation (Marx, 
1909; Marx, 1962) within a given social formation which may 
take the form of a transfer of value from the feudal agri­
culture sectors to the capitalist sector. This notion of 
exchange between two modes of production is central to some 
of the theories of dependency, in particular those that 
claim a central mechanism of imperialism consisting of 
unequal exchange. This is to treat dependent countries as 
having become a part of the social formation due to the 
historical articulational process by which capitalism was 
incorporated. The result is that to some theorists, the 
different modes of production are articulated in such a 
way as either to discourage growth, or to transfer the 
benefits of growth abroad. Industry is owned by foreigners 
who remit potential investment surplus; domestic entre­
preneurs are disinclined to invest and prefer to spend money 
on luxury consumption. 
Amin (1976b) and Kay (.1975) emphasize the role played 
by merchant capital in underdeveloped countries. They 
argued that the expanding world capitalist economy first 
articulated with the peripheral economies by creating a 
class of merchant capitalists. This class did not engage 
in or organize the production process. The consolidation of 
merchants and the dominance of this class proved to be an 
obstacle to the emergence of real industrial bourgeoisie • 
which would organize production along capitalist lines. 
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Another position emphasizes the way in which the de­
pendent economy was disarticulated by the impact of imperi­
alism, and then its various parts reintegrated with the 
metropolitan economy. This position can be found in the 
case of mineral-exporting enclave economies but can be 
argued for all underdeveloped countries. Finally, the de­
pendency theorist argued that reform rests on the restruc­
turing of the mode of articulation of the economy with the 
world economy. But this restructuring will be opposed by 
the ruling class in the dependent countries and by imperial­
ism. The end result will be a revolution or continued 
dependency, said dependency paradigm writers. 
! 
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III. DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION OF AMIN'S THEORY 
The work of Samir Amin is "particularly important for 
current underdevelopment theory because of its scope, its 
awareness of problems ignored by others employing this 
approach" (Bernstein, 1979, p. 98). Chase-Dunn stated that 
The paradigm revolution put forth in Amin*s 
book[s] recasts earlier theories of imperial- • 
ism by integrating the accumulation process, 
class struggle, and exploitation at the level 
of whole systems. His framework for analyzing 
capitalist development resolves many of the 
anomalies confronted by Marxist theory and 
suggests a new perspective on the transition 
to socialism. (Chase-Dunn, 1978, pp. 78-79) 
Amin has written some 20 books or book-length studies, 
has coauthored, edited, or contributed to at least a dozen 
more, and is the author of articles and papers whose numbers 
must run into three figures (Aidan Foster-Carter, 1982). 
However, it is the two books Accumulation on a World Scale 
(1974a) and Unequal Development (1976b) which brought Amin 
international fame. Accumulation on a World Scale consists 
of two volumes which are very much a book for the economist. 
As indicated from its subtitle, "A critique of the theory 
of underdevelopment," Amin structured most of this book around 
a critique of the theories of bourgeoisie economics. He 
considers a criticism of university economics has been very 
useful, for it is through such criticism that these elements 
(of analysis of accumulation on a world scale) have emerged. 
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as in the matter of unequal exchange. This encourages us 
to preserve in the same direction, to appreciate everything 
that the criticism of present"day economics can contribute 
to enriching our thought. After all, Marx's own Capital 
assumed just this form. Marx worked out his concepts by 
way of critique of Ricardo (Amin, 1974b). Nigel Disney 
pointed out that 
Professional economists familiar with the works 
Amin discussed will doubtless find his criticism 
fascinating; those not so familiar will be dis­
mayed at page after page of criticism of this 
or that economist, which end up concluding that 
the economist has nothing of value to contribute. 
(Disney, 1977, p. 127) 
Amin's book Unequal Development has relatively less 
economic and more sociological material; however, the same 
ideas approached in Accumulation on a World Scale are re­
peated in Unequal Development, which made some critic note 
that 
These two works cover virtually identical ground, 
and Unequal Development is perhaps better regarded 
as a second edition of Accumulation on a World 
Scale . . . substantial passages are taîcen virtual­
ly unchanged from the latter and incorporated into 
the former. (Brewer, 1980, p. 233) 
As Aidan Foster-Carter (1982) indicates, Unequal Development 
Remains the most accessible account of the mature 
Amin's general position. It also, like Accumula­
tion on a World Scale, is avowedly a work of 
synthesis; in other words, at some level these 
books can be taken to "represent" not only Amin 
but the "rise to maturity" of an entire school, 
variously characterized as "theories of underde­
velopment" or "dependency." (Brewer, 1980, p. 26) 
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Ainin's fundamental theses have been summarized by 
Aidan Foster-Carter (1982): 
(1) The world capitalist system, consisting of social 
formations in the center and the periphery, is 
integrated into a single world system primarily 
through relations of exchange and unequal special­
ization of production; 
(2) There exists in this global system hierarchical 
structure of modes of production sectors, with 
uneven productivity and heterogeneous relations 
of production; 
(3) Modes of production, sectors of the periphery, are: 
(a) articulated with capitalist social formations 
at the center, but 
(b) disarticulated with respect to social forma­
tions at the periphery; 
(4) This structure of articulation, disarticulation 
is the result of the centuries-old evolution of 
forms of international specialization, dictated 
by the internal dynamics of capitalist social 
formations and imposed on the periphery by the 
center—initially through political domination, 
and subsequently through the mechanism of unequal 
exchange; 
(.5) Transfer of economic surplus value takes place 
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from peripheral capitalist to central social 
formations as a result of primitive accumulation. 
This process survives the pre-history of capi­
talism; its persistence to the present consti­
tutes the essence of the problem of accumulation 
on a world scale. 
Amin defines underdevelopment as the blocking of the 
transition to capitalism of the peripheral social formations 
by the advanced capitalist social formation. The peripheral 
social formation integrated into the capitalist world market 
is prevented from accumulating capital indigenously; capital 
accumulated at the periphery is transmitted to the center 
(rather than being used for development in the periphery) 
either through the direct repatriation of profits, or through 
unequal exchange based on unequal specialization (Disney, 
1977) . 
The development has 
Failed to take off, and cannot take off, in the 
periphery as the conditions of such a process, 
an autonomous accumulation of capital effected 
through the agency of genuine national bourgeoise, 
are pre-empted by dependence on and subordination 
by the capitalist center. (Bernstein, 1979, p. 
84) 
The above was a general summary of Amin*s main ideas. 
The following is a look at some of his concepts in more 
detail. 
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A. Social Formation and Mode of Production 
Amin introduces the concepts "mode of production" and 
"formation" in an attempt to specify the world system, the 
center and periphery in terms that move beyond market cate­
gories, and so in terms that can grasp historical movement 
(Gerstein, 1977). He argues consistently that real history 
can only be understood by the analysis of concrete social 
formations and can't be reduced to a preordained succession 
of modes of production. He distinguishes between these two 
concepts. Mode of production "is an abstract or implying 
no historical order of sequence with respect to the entire 
period of the history of civilization" (Gerstein, 1977, p. 
13) . 
There are six modes of production according to Amin: 
(1) "primitive-communal" mode; (,2) the "tribute-paying"^ 
mode which is the most widespread form of precapitalist 
classes. This mode has two stages, an earlier form and its 
developed forms, the "feudal" mode of production; (3) the 
"slaveowning" ; (4) the simple petty-commodity; (.5) the 
"capitalist"; and (6) the socialist mode of production. 
^Amin points out that the "tribute-paying" mode of 
production, in which surplus product was gathered from 
traditional communities by an overarching political ap­
paratus, cannot be understood in terms of juridicial owner­
ship of means of production alone. This is important to 
the discussion of state capitalism and what he calls the 
"Soviet mode of production." 
50 
1. Social formation 
Modes of production have always existed in a pure 
state; The societies known to history are "formation" that 
on the one hand combine modes of production and on the other 
organize relation between the local society and other socie­
ties expressed in the existence of long-distance trade rela­
tion. 
Social formations are thus concrete, organized 
structures that are marked by a dominant mode 
of production and the articulation around this 
of a complex group of modes of production that 
are subordinate to it. (Amin, 1976b, p. 16) 
Analysis of a concrete social formation must be organ­
ized around an analysis of the way in which the surplus is 
generated in this formation. The transfer of surplus that 
may be effected from or to other'formations, and the internal 
distribution of this surplus among the various recipients— 
classes or social groups. This concept of "surplus" assumes 
different forms in different modes of production, e.g., in 
tribute it takes the form of rent in kind; under capitalism, 
"profit" is the specific form assumed by surplus value when 
it is distributed in proportion to capital invested. 
The concept of the social formation is a historical 
concept. Technological progress—the level of development 
of the productive forces—is cumulative. However, this 
historical sequence of formation is not unique. The histor­
ical sequence of social formation, in contrast to the lack 
51 
of sequence in the mode of production they combine, shows 
that it is absurd to draw any sort of analogy between identi­
cal modes of production integrated in formation, belonging 
to different epochs, e.g., between African or Roman slavery 
and that in 19th century America (Amin, 1976b, p. 22). 
2. Social classes 
The generation and circulation of the surplus within a 
particular formation can identify classes and social groups. 
Each mode of production determines a pair of classes such 
as bourgeois and proletariate in the capitalist mode. Each 
class is defined by the function it fulfills in production 
(see footnote 1 in this chapter), rather than reduced to 
"ownership" of the means of production. Every society has 
a complex group of more than two classes because of the 
combination of mode of production which constitutes a social 
formation. 
3. Center and periphery 
The capitalist mode of production constitutes a world 
system in which all the formations, central and peripheral 
alike, are arranged in a single system, organized and 
hierarchical. The capitalist world market is the only world 
system. 
Amin defines the capitalist mode of production as 
being characterized by the exclusive appropria­
tion by one class of means of production that 
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are themselves the product of social labor. 
This exclusive appropriation by a certain class, 
although it has historically taken the form of 
individual ownership of the means of produc­
tion, may also take collective form. Capi­
talism exists wherever means of production that 
have been produced by social labor are not man­
aged by society as a whole but by a section of 
it, which then becomes a "bourgeoisie." Capi­
talism makes its appearance when the level of 
development of the productive forces is suffi­
ciently advanced for these means of production, 
which are themselves products, to be no longer 
simple enough to be managed by the individual 
producer. The traditional peasant and craftsman 
make their own tools. Industrial workers cannot 
make their own factories. The means of control­
ling society shifts from domination of the natural 
means of production to domination of those means 
of production that are themselves products, e.g. 
equipment, machinery, plants. (Amin, 1976b, p. 
59) 
Three features characterizing the capitalist mode of 
production according to Amin are; (1) the whole social pro­
duction takes the form of commodities; (2) labor power it­
self becomes a commodity, which means that the producer, 
having been separated from the means of production, becomes 
a proletarian; (3) the means of production themselves become 
commodities, in which is materially embodied a social rela­
tionship that of their exclusive appropriation by a particu­
lar class. They become capital. 
Capitalist formations are all marked by the dominance 
of the capitalist mode of production. All products in these 
formations are commodities. In all the precapitalist modes, 
the means of subsistence were not object of exchange and the 
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surplus was often transferred in other than commodity form 
(as tribute or rent in kind). 
In the precapitalist formations, different modes co­
exist and linked together and arranged hierarchically, but 
capitalist mode tends to become exclusive, destroying all 
the others. In the central capitalist formation, the 
capitalist mode of production tends to approximate the pure 
form of capitalism, based on the widening and deepening of 
internal market, while in the peripheral capitalist forma­
tion, the capitalist mode which is dominant, subjects the 
others and transforms them, depriving them of their dis­
tinctive functioning in order to subordinate them to its 
own, without destroying them radically (Amin, 1974b). 
In other words, the center is characterized by self-
expanding or "autocentric" accumulation, relatively differ­
entiated and integrated production. So that in the center, 
Amin asserts. 
The tendency of the capitalist mode of produc­
tion to become exclusive, when based on expan­
sion and deepening of the homemarket is accom­
panied by a tendency for the social structure 
at the center to come close to the pure model 
of capital, characterized by the polarization 
of social classes into two basic classes; 
bourgeoisie and proletariate, with new strata 
"all situated within the framework of the es­
sential division between bourgeoisie and pro­
letariate." (Amin, 1976b, p. 293) 
In the periphery, because the capitalist mode of production 
is introduced from outside and is based on the external 
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market, it does not tend to become exclusive, only dominant; 
thus peripheral capitalism is a formation dominated by the 
capitalist mode of production, but is combined with various 
pre-capitalist modes of production, now distorted showing 
no tendency to vanish. It follows that the formations of 
the periphery will not tend toward polarization. Also, unlike 
the growing homogeneity of the social formations of the 
center, the periphery is characterized by the persisting 
heterogeneity. The form assumed by peripheral formations 
will ultimate depend on the nature of the precapitalist 
formations subjected to attack by the dominant capitalist 
mode of production, on the one hand, and on the other, on the 
form taken by this external attack (historical process). 
However, all of these varied peripheral formations are mov­
ing toward a common pattern of peripheral capitalism. 
The determining link in an autocentric capitalist 
system is that which connects the production of consumer 
goods with the production of the goods that are destined to 
2 
make it possible to produce these consumer goods. This 
link has been a feature of the historical development of 
capitalism at the center of the system. This relation be­
tween the two main branches entails another which is the 
link between the level of development of the productive 
2 This model is based on the schemes of expanded repro­
duction in Marx's Capital, vol. II. 
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forces, the productivity of social labor, with the rate of 
3 the surplus value (and so the level of real wages. The 
external relation of the developed regions (the center) 
with the periphery of the world system is quantitatively 
marginal compared to the internal exchange within the 
center. In short, Amin argues, the economics of the center 
are integrated so that an initial impulse of some sort 
stimulates the whole economy, while in the periphery, the 
stimulus leaks away abroad. 
The pattern* of transition to peripheral capitalism is 
fundamentally different from that of transition to central 
capitalism. The onslaught from without, by the capitalist 
mode of production upon the precapitalist formation, causes 
certain crucial retrogression to take place. Peripheral 
An important part of Amin's account of the relation be­
tween center and periphery rests on the fact that wages in 
the center have increased in line with productivity since 
1900, and so Amin argues that rising wages in the center 
and constant wages in the periphery brought into existence 
the mechanisms of unequal exchange. Increased wages as a 
result of increased productivity (rise in the organic com­
position of capital) made the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall and that must be offset by increased exploitation in 
the periphery. 
^Capitalist development in the periphery was blocked. 
Since the periphery could compete only in resource-based 
export (minerals, tropical agriculture), and there could 
only be limited development oriented to the narrow domestic 
market luxury goods demanded by small minority of the popu­
lation, the larger part of the population became marginal­
ized. This contrast between center and periphery is the 
final disproof of evolutionary theories of eqonoiaic develop­
ment and nation building. 
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capitalism is manifested in three kinds of distortion; 
(1) The distortion towards export activities "extra-
version" . 
(2) The abnormal enlargement hypertrophy of the ter­
tiary sector which reflects (a) the difficulties 
in realizing surplus value at the center, 
(b) limitations of peripheral development: in­
adequate industrialization and increasing unem­
ployment. This hypertrophy of unproductive 
activity expressed especially in the excessive 
growth of administrative expenditure and a quasi-
permanent crisis of government finance. 
(3) The distortion toward light branches of activity, 
together with employment of modern production 
techniques in these branches. This distortion is 
the source of special problems that dictate de­
velopment policies in the periphery that are dif­
ferent from those on which the development of the 
West was based (Amin, 1976b, p. 201). 
Underdevelopment is manifested not in level of production 
per head, but in certain characteristic structural features 
that "oblige us not to confuse the underdeveloped countries 
with now-advanced countries as they were at an earlier stage 
of their development" (Amin, 1976b, p. 201). These features 
are; (1) extreme unevenness in the distribution of 
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productivities and in the system of prices transmitted from 
the center, (2) disarticulation due to the adjustment of 
the economy to the needs of the center, which prevents the 
transmission of the benefits of economic progress from 
the poles of development to the economy as a whole, and 
(3) economic domination by the center, which is expressed 
in the forms of international specialization (the structures 
of world trade in which the center shapes the periphery in 
accordance with its needs). As economic growth proceeds, 
features of underdevelopment are accentuated, autocentric 
growth is impossible, whatever output per capita is achieved. 
B. The Extraversion of the Periphery 
Amin indicates that 
Extraversion must not be reduced to the quanti­
tative importance of exporting activities in 
the underdeveloped economies with import sub­
stitution industrialization, extraversion as­
sumes new forms, nevertheless. This quantita­
tive predominance of the exporting activities 
has remained typical of the underdeveloped 
world. (Amin, 1976b, p. 203) 
Higher proportion of income of underdeveloped countries comes 
from export activities. But Amin pointed out that 
This empirical approach is inadequate. The 
distortion toward exporting activities in the 
allocation of both financial resources (direct 
investment, the infrastructure created to 
serve the exporting areas and sectors, etc.) 
and human one (.orientation of training and 
education in accordance with the needs of inte­
gration into the world capitalist market) gives 
extraversion a qualitative dimension and asserts 
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the dominance of the exporting sector over the 
economic structure as a whole, which is subject 
to and shaped by the requirements of the ex­
ternal market. (Amin, 1976b, p. 203) 
Growth of imports to underdeveloped countries increased 
out of proportion due to; (1) Urban development, without 
adequate increase in agricultural production of food stuff. 
This leads to increasing import of basic food products. 
(2) Increase in administration expenditure beyond the possi­
bilities of the local economy. (3) Change in the structures 
of income distribution, with "Westernization" of the way of 
life and consumer habits of the privileged strata, leads to 
import of luxurious goods and services unnecessary for the 
society. (4) Lack of or inadequate industrial development 
and disequilibrium in the industrial structures is necessary 
to import production goods and intermediate goods. These 
processes enhance the dependent status of underdeveloped 
countries. 
1. Disarticulation 
The advanced economy is an "integrated whole, a feature 
of which is a very dense flow of internal exchange, the flow 
of external exchanges of the atoms that make up this whole 
being, by and large, marginal as compared with that of in­
ternal exchange" (Amin, 1976b, p. 237). In contrast, 
The underdeveloped economy is made up of atoms 
that are relatively juxtaposed and not integrated, 
the density of the flow of external exchange of 
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these atoms being much greater, and that of the 
flow of internal exchanges very much less. {.Amin, 
1976b, p. 237) 
In a structured autocentric economy, any progress that be­
gins at any point is spread throughout the entire organism 
by many convergent mechanisms. Progress is diffused from 
industries that can be regarded as poles of development. In 
contrast, the extraverted "underdeveloped economy is made up 
of sectors, of firms that are juxtaposed and not highly inte­
grated among themselves, but are each of them strongly inte­
grated into . . . the centers of capitalistic word" (Amin, 
1976b, p. 238). The weakness of national cohesion in the 
Third World is a reflection of this disarticulation. 
2. Marqinalization 
The distortion of economic activity of the underde­
veloped countries toward the tertiary sector (commerce, 
services/ administration, transport) which provide more than 
50 percent of the product, even more in the case of higher 
degree of integration in the world market, whereas the share 
of secondary sector (industry, building) is much smaller. 
The distribution of labor force is distorted. The propor­
tion of labor force engaged in tertiary activities is very 
much greater than that engaged in secondary sector occupa­
tion. Unlike the central model, the traditional peasants 
who are released from agriculture and the ruined craftsmen 
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went to the tertiary rather than secondary sector, and this 
happened from the beginning of the process of modern urban 
growth in connection with integration into the world capi­
talism. 
The transition to peripheral capitalism from without 
by means of trade carried out by the capitalist mode of pro­
duction upon the precapitalist formations causes retrogres­
sion, such as the ruin of the crafts through competition 
from imported manufacture, without their being replaced by 
local industrial production. 
The distortion of precapitalism agrarian relations 
evicts a large part of the population from land, proletariz-
ing the people, which altered the original society and de­
prived it of its traditional character. This change brought 
about urbanization without industrialization and concentra­
tion of capital. 
3. Dependency 
Domination by the center is not a consquence of the 
fact that the periphery's exports are made up of basic 
products, but of the fact that the peripheral economies are 
only producers of basic products, which means that this pro­
duction is not integrated into an autocentric industrial 
structure. The manifestation of this dependence is that 
the periphery does most of its trade with the center. 
Domination of periphery by foreign capital leads to an 
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outflow of profits. The transfer of surplus through tech­
nological dependence will gradually tend to replace comina-
tion through direct appropriation. Monopoly of the tech­
nology by the center reflects the new form of dependence. 
It means, in economistic terms. 
The transfer from the periphery to the center 
of the multiplier mechanisms, which cause ac­
cumulation at the center to be a cumulative 
process. From this transfer results the con­
spicuous disarticulation of the underdeveloped 
economy, the dualism of this economy, and in 
the end, the blocking of the economy's growth. 
(Amifi, 1976b, p. 288) 
The center's need for primary products (agricultural 
and mineral) from the periphery which leads to narrowing its 
range of productive activity is based on the rate of growth 
of the center. This dictates the growth of the periphery. 
C. Sectoral Unevenness in Productivity 
The tendency of the capitalist mode of production at 
the periphery center is toward (1) uniforming the labor time 
and reducing it to its simplest, least skilled category, 
and rewarding it at a uniform rate; (2) equalization of the 
rate of the profit among sectors; and C3) intensive use of 
capital in all branches of the economy which constitutes 
an increase in productivity. It is because "the capitalist 
mode of production has not taken hold of all the branches 
of production as it has in the center" that we find such a 
"big divergence for the organic compositions of capital" 
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and so in turn in productivity. It is this "circumstance 
that accounts for the sectoral differences in rewards, and 
constitutes the principal aspect of the problem of uneven-
ness in the distribution of income in the Third World." 
Unevenness of productivity between branches in the 
periphery expresses the uneven degree of modernization re­
sulting from uneven penetration by the capitalist mode of 
production. Unevenness of productivity is often reflected 
in unequal rates of profit, but also in unequal rewards of 
labor, especially where sectors that do not belong to the 
capitalist mode are concerned as is often the case with 
rural production. The juxtaposition of the two economic 
systems that belong to different epochs whose levels of pro­
ductivity are so divergent were part of the unequality of 
income distribution. 
1. Unequal exchange 
The relation between the center and the periphery is 
described as primitive accumulation, a form of relationship 
that characterizes economic instance of contact between a 
pure capitalist mode with some other formation. 
The mechanism of primitive accumulation is unequal 
exchange. "The exchange of products of unequal value (whose 
prices of production are unequal) . . . this means the reward 
will become unequal" (Amin, 1974b, p. 88). Thus, primitive 
accumulation is not only characterized by the prehistory of 
r 
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capitalist mode of production, it "continues to operate and 
to be characteristic of relations between the center and 
periphery" (Amin, 1974b, p. 38). It continues because the 
"prehistory is not over and done with; it goes on, through 
the extension of capitalism on the world scale" '(Amin, 
1974b, p. 38). 
Relations between the center and periphery took dif­
ferent forms depending on the different stages of the 
periodization of the system which is determined by the rhythm 
of an expanded reproduction at the center internally. 
(1) Precapitalist (16th century): Trade relations be­
tween the center in process of formation (western Europe) and 
the new periphery that it formed in the mercantile period 
were vital for the genesis of capitalism. The commercial 
relations of this period were quantitatively and qualitative­
ly a fundamental element in the period when capitalist sys­
tems were formed. The greater part of the internal exchange, 
taking place at the center redistributed products, originated 
in the periphery. The center imported luxury consumer goods 
and products of agriculture and crafts. The center obtains 
these products through simple exchange, through plunder, and 
through organizing production that was established for this 
purpose. The accumulation of money capital in the ports of 
Europe as a result of selling products of the periphery to 
the ruling classes. This process speeds up the 
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disintegration of the feudal mode of production (Amin, 1974b, 
p. 40; 1976b, p. 155). 
(2) Between the Industrial Revolution and the complete 
conquest of the world (1780-1900), a period marked by pause 
in primitive accumulation. The old forms, e.g. plundering, 
etc., gradually faded away and new forms took shape only 
slowly. However, it is the first time in history that 
international specialization became possible. The center 
(first Britain) exported to the periphery manufactured goods. 
It imported mainly agricultural products. Gradually world 
trade became split into two groups of exchange with differing 
functions: exchange between the center and the periphery, 
and internal exchange within the center. The proportion of 
world trade contributed by trade between center and periphery 
declined, while exchange within the center increased. This 
means that the development of .capitalism in the center has 
increased the relative intensity of the internal flows, but 
in the periphery it has increased only that of the external 
flows. Underdeveloped countries increasingly are becoming 
specialized in the export of a few basic products. 
In this period, capitalism was competitive extension 
of the market that took place in the market of the outside 
world in a context of competition between the enterprises 
of the metropolitan countries. 
C3) Imperialism: The mechanism of primitive 
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accumulation for the benefit of the center reappeared in a 
new form. Imperialism is characterized by unequal exchange 
(the exchange of products whose prices of production are 
unequal) which, in turn, means that the rewarding of labor 
became unequal. The export of commodities was accompanied 
by that of capital. "The export of capital did not replace 
the export of goods; on the contrary, it gave the latter a 
fillip." Imperialism was to make possible changes in the 
way the periphery specialized. The periphery ceased to 
export agricultural products, and became an exporter of 
goods produced by modern capitalist enterprises with a very 
high productivity such as the oil industry. The bulk of 
the center's capital investments in the periphery is in 
the exporting activities (mining, oil, primary processing of 
mineral industry) with the second place being tertiary 
activities connected with exports, and industry producing 
for the local market playing only a minor role. 
In every stage of the world capitalist development, 
the commercial and final relation between the center and 
periphery serve two functions; (.1) To facilitate by extend­
ing the capitalist market at the expense of the precapi­
talist system and to absorb the surplus, and (2) to increase 
the average rate of profit. However, in the age of competi­
tive capitalism, it has an objective need, for the expansion 
of the market: (1) the inadequacy of the market in the 
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center and (2) for maximizing the rate of profit-seeking 
abroad for cheaper goods for popular consumption so the 
cost of labor can be reduced, as well as the cost of raw 
materials to make possible the reduction of the value of 
the constant capital. 
In the age of monopoly, competition between firms no 
longer proceeds by way of price cut. Wages at the center 
rise with the rise of productivity (as required for auto-
centric accumulation). Export of capital was necessary to 
co'jjiter the falling rate of profit at the center. There­
fore, the periphery role reduced as a mechanism of absorp­
tion to that of raising the level of the rate of profit. 
It is through export of capital that forms of production to 
be established in the periphery although modern, but never­
theless enjoyed the advantage of low wages-cost. It was 
then the unequal exchange appeared. 
D. A New Foirm of Monopoly (Postimperialism) 
After 1945, the forms of international specialization 
were changed. Three structural changes marked the present 
period; (.1) multinational corporations operating on the 
world scale; (2) technological revolution toward ultramodern 
branches requiring highly skilled labor such as electronics, 
space research, etc., which renders obsolete the classical 
mode of accumulation; and (.3) concentration of technological 
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knowledge in the giant transnational firms (Amin, 1974b; 
1976b, pp. 189-190). 
The technological domination is the new form of monopoly 
as a means of obtaining extra surplus value of the rate of 
profit. "The return flow of profits from the periphery to 
the center is going to increase, and the underdeveloped 
countries are going to become sources of capital for the 
center. . . technological revolution is going to make it 
possible for a new type of unequal international specializa­
tion to take shape" (Amin, 1976b, pp. 189-190). 
The new form of unequal specialization and consequently 
uneven development of the world system would be in the form 
where the Third World specialized in industrial production 
of classical type, while the center keeps the ultra modern 
branches of activity. 
The relationship between developed and underdeveloped 
countries is a historical process that resulted from the 
expansion of capitalism to pre-capitalist nation as a means 
to check the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Samir 
Amin has identified the dynamics of the deepening expansion 
process as the means by which capitalism checks the tendency 
of the rate of profit to fall: (.1) Increasing the rate of 
surplus value {.which means aggravating the conditions of 
capitalist exploitation at the center, which implies rela­
tive impoverishment) ; (.2) spreading the capitalist mode of 
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production to new regions where the rate of surplus value 
is higher and it is possible to obtain a superprofit through 
unequal exchange; (3) developing various forms of waste 
(military expenditure, luxury consumption, etc.). 
The stage of imperialism reflected in the dominance of 
the second mechanism when the main thrust of capitalist de­
velopment is the deepening expansion of the capitalist mode 
of production to new areas. 
This extension is the work of central capital­
ism, which strives in this way to find a solu­
tion to its own problems. It is because central 
capitalism holds the initiative in this extension 
that relations between center and periphery con­
tinue to be asymmetrical. Indeed, this is why 
a periphery exists and is continually being 
renewed. (Amin, 1976b, p. 287) 
E. Critique of Samir Amin 
Anthony Brewer pointed out that 
His [Amin's] is the only serious attempt to 
tackle what is surely the central problem, 
that of analyzing accumulation on a world scale, 
a dynamic process involving social formations 
of very divergent structures linked into a single 
world capitalist economy. In the process, he has 
tried to link together a range of subjects that 
had previously been studied in virtual isolation 
from each other: mode of production, class struc­
tures in the periphery, the pattern of inter­
national trade and specialization, the formation 
of international prices, the [economic] problems 
of national development in the periphery, the 
periodization of capitalist development, and so 
on. To base the problem is the important step. 
(Brewer, 1980, p. 257) 
It is obvious that this broad range of work would attract a 
lot of criticism at different levels. Therefore, criticism 
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of Amin can be arranged around five areas: ideology, method, 
logic, theory, and empirical findings. 
1. Ideology 
Some writers describe Amin as a nationalistic (Smith, 
19 80) committed to the national bourgeoisie of the 
peripheral countries (Gerstein, 1977), concerned with • 
technical prescriptions that would be useful to them 
(national bourgeoisie) in its struggle for independent de­
velopment (Gerstein, 1977). I believe it is not the case, 
and Amin himself denied that strongly. 
2. Methodology 
Ira Gerstein and Mohammad Ja'far accused Amin's analy­
sis of being ^historical. Primitive accumulation is, accord­
ing to Gerstein, a "historically specific term, descriptive 
of the transition from feudalism to capitalism." But Amin 
"transforms and misuses [it]" to "simply refer to contact 
between a dominant capitalist mode and a dominated forma­
tion" (Gerstein, 1977, p. 3). 
Mohammad Ja'far (1978) criticized Amin for his histori­
cal notion of a mode of production, and consequently his 
ahistorical conception of the nation. Ja'far said, "To deny 
a historical order among modes of production is just as to 
deny order and direction in biological evolution" (Ja'far, 
1978, p. 76). 
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Amin (1976b, p. 13) affirms that "the concept of a 
'mode of production' is an abstract one, implying no histori­
cal order of sequence with respect to the entire period of 
history (civilizations that stretch from the first differ­
entiated formations right down to capitalism)." Amin (1976b, 
p. 16) indicates that "mode of production has never existed 
in a pure state: the societies known to history are 'forma­
tions' . . . combine mode of production." 
It is the concept of the social formation, according 
to Amin, that indeed is a historical concept, which means 
that the level of development of the productive forces is 
cumulative. 
However, this historical sequence of formations 
is not unique. The principal, most common line 
of development shows us first a series of coiranunal 
formations, then a series of tribute-paying ones. 
But this main line becomes relatively "blocked" 
in that technological progress may take place with 
the tribute-paying formation. ... A secondary 
marginal line of development shows a succession 
of communal formations, and then of feudal forma­
tions (which are a borderline variety of the 
tribute-paying family) with a strong commodity 
element in them (.slave owning-commodity and/or non-
si aveowning simple commodity). (Amin, 1976b, p. 21) 
Amin justified the historical sequence of social formations 
and lack of sequence in the mode of production that are com­
bined make it "absurd to draw any sort of analogy between 
identical modes of production integrated in formation, be­
longing to different epochs" (Amin, 1976b, p. 22). 
Related to the issues of mode of production is the 
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concept of the nation. Amin (1976b, p. 27) pointed out that 
Nation is a social phenomenon that can appeal 
at any stage of history and is not necessarily 
associated with the capitalist mode of produc­
tion. It arises when any dominant social class— 
bourgeois, feudal, merchant—controlling the 
central state machinery ensures economic unity 
of any ethnic group. 
Nation, according to Amin, can appear when a shared geog­
raphy and community of language and culture and when over 
and above 
A social class, controlling the central state 
machinery, ensures economic unity of the com­
munity's life. That is, when the organization 
by this dominant class of the generation, the 
circulation, and distribution of the surplus, 
welds together into one the fates of the various 
provinces. (Amin, 1976b, p. 27) 
Amin found the classical Marxist formulation that national 
formation begins with the very earliest stages of capitalism 
is "unacceptable, for it is clear that imperial China or 
ancient Egypt were not mere conglomerations of people" 
(Amin, 1976b, p. 27). The nation as a national phenomenon 
"is reversible; it can flourish or it can disappear, depend­
ing on whether the unifying class strengthens its power or 
loses it. In the latter case, the given society regresses 
to become a conglomeration of ethnic groups that may become 
increasingly differentiated" (.Amin, 1976b, p. 28) . Amin 
maintains that the 
Arab unity was the historical product of the 
mercantile integration of the Arab world, as 
carried out by a class of merchant-warriors. 
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It was only with the decline of trade relations 
that national disintegration set in, a disinte­
gration which was accentuated by integration of 
the Arab world into the imperialist system. 
(Amin, 1978a, p. 7) 
Ja'far rejected Amin's conception of nation formation as 
ahistorical which resulted from Amin's ahistorical notion 
of mode of production. Ja'far claimed that only in the 19th 
century does the Arab nation emerge "parallel with the growth 
of capitalist economic penetration and trade with the ad­
vanced and capitalist countries" (Ja'far, 197Ry p. 79). 
3. Logic 
Bernstein describes Amin's major texts to contain "an 
encyclopaedic tangle of categories and methods which is 
self-reinforcing and results in a series of mutually contra­
dictory proposition" (Bernstein, 1979, p. 98). Bernstein 
pointed out two contradicting conceptualizations of the 
peripheral social formations. "One coincides exactly with 
dualism^ . . . the coexistence of separate sectors, often 
expressed as an export enclave, and a subsistence sector." 
"Two sectors coexist without interpenetrating and the 
economy does not form an integral unity" (.Amin) . The 
second conforms to the idea of articulation of modes of 
5 
Nigel Disney (1977) talks about Amin's fault "despite 
lengthy critiques ... of the marginalist and the 'dualism' 
theories, here he produces this concept, in his analysis: 
the 'modern' and 'traditional' sectors so beloved by the 
marginalist" (p. 125). 
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production. In the peripheral formations, "the capitalist 
mode, which is dominant, subjects the others and transforms 
them, depriving them of this distinctive functioning in 
order to subordinate them to its own, without, however, 
radically destroying them" (Amin). Finally, "despite 
their different origins, the peripheral formations tend 
to converge toward a pattern that is essentially the same. 
This phenomenon reflects, on the world scale, the increas­
ing power of capitalism to unify" (Bernstein, 1979, p. 88). 
Brewer (1980) also criticized Amin's treatment of 
feudalism as inconsistent. He describes it as the most 
developed form of the tribute-paying mode which "when well-
developed, nearly always tends to become feudal—as in China, 
India, Egypt" (Amin, 1974b, p. 140), which means that the 
center tribute-paying formations were moving towards feudal­
ism. But in another place, he describes feudalism as 
peripheral to the center tribute-paying mode. Because it 
is developed in areas where centralizing tendencies were 
weaker and where natural conditions were less favorable 
(Amin, 1976b, p. 55). 
Brewer (.1980) also indicated that Amin's argument about 
central accumulation is a confused argument. But he admits 
that surgical excision might be both necessary and possible. 
Much of the criticism even thus overstated came from 
the fact that "Amin tries to reconcile ideas that are in 
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fact irreconcilable, and is led into inconsistencies" 
(Brewer, 1980, p. 233). 
4. Theory 
Henry Bernstein uses Hirts's definition of theory as a 
"logical structure of concepts which designates an object to 
be explained and which provides a mechanism of explanation 
for that object." He thinks that the general characteristics 
of peripheral formation "are not theoretically specified, 
but are empirical generalization (and of low order). Most of 
the examples are drawn from Africa, and the generalizations 
themselves are subject to subclassifications that are crude­
ly inductivist in form" (Bernstein, 1979, p. 95). 
Sheila Smith characterizes Amin's work as "a fully elab­
orated theoretical scheme in the Marxist tradition" (Smith, 
1980, p. 5). She also praises Amin's "wealth of illustrative 
material which is scholarly and useful" (Smith, 1980, p. 9) , 
while Bernstein disregards it as being "crudely inductivist 
in form" and as not theoretically specified. However, Smith 
found the analysis based on the information was uninforma-
tive because 
The basis of selection of the information is 
given by the Theory. . . . The information 
provided may indeed serve the function for 
which it was selected, i.e. to demonstrate 
the correctness of the theory. (Smith, 1980, 
p. 13) 
I don't think that Bernstein's theoretical rigor or 
75 
Smith's empiricism can offer a better job than Amin. Be­
sides, critics are hard to satisfy. Social scientists, and 
Amin among them, always have to face some methodological 
problem. 
5. Empirical findings 
Jonathan Schiffer claimed that the available evidence 
does not support Amin's contention of "blocked capitalistic 
development." The statistical evidence about post-war 
development trends which he presents "suggests that Amin is 
wrong in just every aspect of his approach to the develop­
ment of capitalism in LDCs" (Schiffer, 1981, p. 32). 
Schiffer indicates: 
(1) The post-war performance of the LDCs (less developed 
countries) has been extremely impressive in their 
GDP and saving and investments. Amin never denied 
such rapid quantitative growth. Different indices 
draw a different picture. Schiffer's choice of 
indicators may present positive rather than nega­
tive results. Selection of the countries also in­
fluences the results by choosing relatively better-
off countries. Amin was interested in transforming 
the economy, not growth. 
(.2) That internal markets are expanding in LDCs and 
manufacturing activities increased and their out­
put mainly of nondurable products are for 
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consumption in the internal domestic market. 
(3) That LDCs moving toward heavy industry's produc­
tion. While he admits the growth is still small, 
the trend is impressive. 
Schiffer proves to be right about the expanding of the 
internal market. After all, people have some money to spend. 
But he missed the point. Amin is concerned about distortion 
in structure of production and consumption. 
In the opposite direction, Gerhard Tschannerl's (1976) 
case study of Tanzania supports the framework of Amin's 
thesis. Distortion toward export sector and luxury consumer 
goods in terms of output and employment. 
6. Other criticisms 
(1) Lack of clarity about the role of the state (Disney, 
1977; Chase-Dunn, 1978). 
His lack of attention to the state, the process 
of state formation, and the state system (or 
"international system"). Amin reflects on the 
rising importance of the contemporary state in 
both the center and the periphery, but fails to 
see that the system of multiple, unequal and 
competing nation-state, and the structure of 
colonial empires organized by the great powers, 
has been essential to the functioning of world 
capitalism from the beginning. (Chase-Dunn, 
1978, p. 80) 
(2) Some argued that in "Amin's work, a Marxist vocabu­
lary serves as the medium through which a structuralist-non-
Marxist conception of capitalism operates" (Bernstein, 1979, 
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p. 79). And Nigel Disney (1977) stated that "Amin's lack 
of theoretical clarity is in large part due to his failure 
to break completely with the concepts of non-Marxist 
economics" (Disney, 1977, p. 127). 
(3) G. Rubinstein, G. Smirnov and Solodovnikove 
(Russian scholars) call Amin's theoretical model "artificial 
and far-fetched. We certainly cannot draw general regulari­
ties of the 'third world' development on its basis" 
(Rubinstein et al., 1976, p. 104). 
F. Short Biography of Samir Amin 
Samir Amin was born in Cairo in 1931. He pursued his 
university education in Paris where he took three degrees : 
Institute of Political Studies, 1954; Institute of Statis­
tics, 1955; and a Ph.D. in economics in 1957. 
Amin's first employment after completing his studies 
was with the Economic Development Organization in Cairo, 
1960-62. From 1960-63, he worked as a technical advisor 
for planning in Mali. 
For three years since 1953 he returned to the Univer­
sity of Paris and Dakar as professor of economics. 
In 1970, Amin became the Director of the United Nations 
African Institute for Economic Development Planning in 
Dakar-Sinegal. 
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IV. TESTING CORRESPONDENCE OF PROPOSITIONS 
AND AVAILABLE EMPIRICAL/HISTORICAL DATA 
TO SAUDI ARABIA 
Samir Amin indicates that development processes in the 
periphery of the world system follow a specific pattern 
which is different from that of the center. The penetra­
tion of capitalism from abroad, through trade and export 
sectors, will produce different processes. Development of 
underdevelopment, as he puts it, stems from the distortions 
working against an autocentric, self-centered development 
which characterized the developed nations (the center). 
Instead, the development in the periphery is hampered by 
certain features such as; (1) Externally oriented, hence 
dependent development based on extension integration on the 
world system marked by specialization and unequal exchange 
in the division of labor which would restrict the growth 
of LDS's economies to the production of mineral and other 
primary products. This productive structure will lead them 
to consume what they do not produce, and to produce what 
they do not consume. 
(2) Distortion in the structure of the model of 
development and organization of the productive processes 
which leads to (a) uneven development among sectors, 
(b) distortion toward unproductive activities, (c) disartic­
ulation within the national economy. The result is an in­
crease in inequality between regions and groups of people 
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in income and wealth and increase of concentration of social 
resources to the few while marginalization of large masses 
of the population. The distortion of pre-capitalist rela­
tion of production proletarize great masses of people in 
rural and nomadic regions and alienate them from the means 
of production, and they become marginalized. 
This chapter is devoted to the examination of these 
propositions on Saudi Arabian case as a concrete situation 
of a transformed peripheral capitalist development country. 
Hopefully, the empirical evidences from Saudi Arabia would 
show to us whether the specific situation of Saudi Arabia 
follows the same pattern predicted by Amin's theory of 
peripheral capitalist development. 
The analysis is arranged in three sections, according 
to the three general propositions ; 
A. Extraversions and dependency economic structure 
(externally oriented) 
B. Structure of the model of development and organiza­
tion of the productive process 
1. Uneven development 
2. Distortion toward unproductive activity 
3. Disarticulation within the national economy 
C. Social inequality 
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A. Extraverted Economic Structure 
Externally oriented, hence dependent development: the 
foreign trade plays a decisive role in the model of periph­
ery capitalist development. The periphery countries carry 
out a vigorous trade with the center countries mainly in 
the export of primary goods and the import of consumer and 
production goods. This trade constitutes the largest part 
of the periphery economic activities, and they trade large-
..J-y with the center. They trade very little among themselves 
(LDCs). The countries at the center, on the other hand, 
trade primarily with one another and less with the periphery. 
Thus, 80 percent of the trade of developed countries takes 
place between them and 20 percent with the underdeveloped 
world. On the contrary, only 20 percent of the latter's 
trade takes place among themselves, and the rest with the 
developed countries (Amin, 1976b, p. 160). 
The list of the dependent and extraverted economy is 
characterized by a higher degree in export, import, 
specialization in one commodity, concentration of trade 
partners, export of raw materials, import of finished goods, 
and dependence of country's income on export of one commod­
ity. To test the above statement, we can transform it to 
a testable proposition; The higher the ratio of export and 
import to the gross domestic product (GDP), (Import + 
Export)/GDP = the more externally oriented and integrated 
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in the world system is the country, and hence, dependent 
and vulnerable to the world market. 
An indicator of the degree of extraversion for Saudi 
Arabia (see Table 2). 
Table 2. Export and import/GDP, 1960-81; ratio of export 
and import to GDP& 
(Export + Import)/GDP (%) 
1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1975 1979 1980 1981 
.73 .79 .88 .94 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
^Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1972-1981); IMF (1982, 
1983). 
Table 2 shows the importance of export and import to 
the economy, increasing from 73 percent in 1960 to 100 per­
cent, since 1974 an increase of 27 percent. Whenever the 
indicator is high, it points out the explosion of the local 
economy to the external world market. This trend seems to 
hold true to other oil-producing countries. For example, 
Kuwait export and import proportion to its GDP can be seen 
in Table 3. 
The same is also true in another oil-producing country 
such as United Arab Emirat (see Table 4). 
Even though the oil-exporting countries show similar 
trends, the nonoil-producing "Third World" countries follow 
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Table 3. Export and import proportion of GDP in Kuwait^ 
1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 
85 91 92 93 101 
^International Monetary Fund (1982). 
Table 4. Ratio of export and import to GDP in UAE^ 
1972 1974 1978 1980 
1.21 1.20 1.0 1.12 
^International Monetary Fund (1982, 1983). 
the same pattern as well, but to a lesser degree, as Table 5 
shows. 
Table 5. Ratio of export and import to GDP in Egypt and 
Colombia^ 
1970 1974 1978 1980 
Egypt .99 1.0 .95 
Colombia .30 .30 .88 
^International Monetary Fund (1982, 1983). 
Expenditure on exports represented 82.0 and 79.8 of 
the total GDP in 1975 and 1979, respectively, while total 
private and government consumption and capital formation 
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represented 42 percent and 20 percent, respectively. The 
high ratio of imports to GDP (43.2 percent) for 1979 and 
the ratio of import expenditure to consumption and capital 
formation expenditures (70 percent) reflect how greatly 
Saudi Arabia economy depends on the outside world to satisfy 
its needs for goods and services (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Gross domestic product uses, 1975, 1979^, 1980^ 
1981^ 
1975 1979 1980 1981 
Government final consumption 11, ,4 20, 5 23, .0 16, .0 
Private final consumption 12, .8 21, .5 19, .0 19, .6 
Gross fixed capital formation 12. 8 20, 1 24, ,0 22. ,0 
Change in stock 0. ,5 1. ,3 1. 0 3. ,0 
Export 82. ,0 79. 8 69. 0 70. ,0 
Import -19. ,5 -43. 2 -35. 0 -30. ,7 
Total 100. ,0 100. ,0 100. ,0 100. ,0 
Saudi Arabian Government Ministry of Planning (1980); 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1980); International Mone­
tary Fund (1982, 1983). 
^World Bank. 
The trend indicated that the national economic struc­
ture becomes more dependent on export and important activi­
ties, which resulted from the integration of the world 
economic system. This is the opposite of self-reliant 
autocentric development strategies pursued by the developed 
countries in the center. The United States and Japan are 
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the leading countries in export and import. Their export 
and import contribute less to their GDP (see Table 7). 
Table 7. Proportion of U.S. and Japan export and import 
to total GDPa 
1960 1965 1970 1973 1974 1978 1980 1981 
U.S. .09 .09 .11 .14 .17 .17 .21 .20 
Japan .22 .20 .21 .20 .29 .22 .31 .33 
^International Monetary Fund (1982, 1983). 
Saudi Arabia has become increasingly integrated in the 
international/world economic system. It is estimated that 
Saudi Arabia holds about $180 billion in reserves in Western 
banks. Of these holdings, more than half of the money is 
in treasury bills in the United States (The Economist, 1982). 
"The amount of money being held abroad privately by Saudis 
is increasing fast and is subject to no such sense of 
responsibility" (The Economist, 1982, p. 20). 
The private Saudi investors are reckoned to have some 
$50 billion abroad. Saudi Arabia has "such a stake in the 
world banking system that it seems they must keep most of 
their money there" (The Economist, 1982, p. 26). Saudi 
Arabia became a permanent full member of International 
Monetary Funds and other organizations. 
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Hundreds of multinational corporations and foreign 
companies are working in Saudi Arabia in construction, 
petrochemicals, training, etc. of these companies. "There 
are 400 American companies and 45,000 American citizens in 
Saudi Arabia" (The Economist, 1982, p. 20). 
It is estimated that there are about 1.5 million 
foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. About 45 percent of the 
labor force is made up of foreign workers from 109 nation­
alities (Al-Yamamah, 1982). Their share of economic activi­
ties is high indeed, as Table 8 shows. 
Table 8. Share of immigrant labor by economic sectors, 
1975^ 
Sector Percent 
Agriculture and fishing 9. 4 
Mining and petroleum 43.0 
Manuf acturing 81.4 
Electricity, gas and water 64.6 
Construction 85.0 
Wholesale and retail trade 68.5 
Transportation, storage and communication 29.8 
Financial insurance 57.4 
Community and personal services 45.0 
^Birks and Sinclair (1980, p. 160). 
Amin points to the fact that the development of capi­
talism at the center has increased the relative interests 
of internal flows, but in the periphery it has- increased 
86 
only that of the external flows^ (Amin, 1976b). 
Another indicator of the externally oriented develop­
ment is the higher the ratio of export to the GDP, the more 
integrated the economy into the world market and its de­
velopment is based on the external demand. 
The export data of Saudi Arabia reveal a constant in­
crease of the ratio of export to GDP, Export/GDP = import­
ance of exports to the economy (Table 9). 
Table 9. Proportion of export to GDP^ 
1960 1965 1970 1973 1975 Ï978 1980 
.52 .60 .59 .74 .82 .62 .68 
^Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1980, 1981); Inter­
national Monetary Fund (1982, 1983). 
The Saudi Arabian data conform to the pattern of de­
velopment predicted by Amin, which means the increased reli­
ance of an export stimulated by external demand located main­
ly in the center of the system. The U.S. and Japan, in com­
parison to Saudi Arabia, confirm the pattern of the central 
development. They showed the small percentage of export to 
their GDP. This means that the major economic activities are 
located internally to satisfy local demands (Table 10). 
^This, however, may change according to Amin so the per­
iphery might specialize in industrial production of the clas­
sical type, while the center will keep for itself the ultra­
modern technology. Thus, now a form of unequal specializa­
tion will take place in a continuing uneven development of 
the world system. 
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Table 10. Proportion of export to GDP in U.S. and Japan^ 
1970 1974 1978 1980 1981 
U.S. 
Japan 
.06 
.11 
.08 
.14 
.08 
.11 
.10 
.15 ]l6b 
^International Monetary Fund (1982, 1983). 
^Only GNP available. 
The higher the concentration of export of one commodity 
the higher the specialization and dependency. 
Exp°rt of the major conimoaity , ^ j concen-
Total export iration 
Saudi Arabia depends heavily on the export of oil; 
therefore, oil export can be used as a percentage of the 
total export. The results is shown in Table 11. 
Table 11. Oil export as a percentage of total export^ 
1970 1973 1974 1978 1980 
99.5 99.6 99.1 99.6 99.7 
^Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1980, 1981). 
The table shows the high degree of specialization in 
producing and exporting just one commodity, oil. This 
high dependency on the production of oil increased the 
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vulnerability of the country to political and economic 
pressure from outside, and limited the development policy 
to uncertainty. The domination of the oil sector has be­
come so intensive that it destroyed and distorted the tra­
ditional pre-capitalist activities in the country, such 
as crafts and agriculture production. 
The export sector in the LDCs is a sort of "enclave-
type" which is connected to the advance countries (the 
center) economically and technologically. The modern high-
productivity of this export sector represents the capital­
ist development in the periphery (Amin, 1976b). This lack 
of integration of the export sector with local economy re­
duced its multiplier effect and the forward and backward 
linkage (Hirschman, 1969) to other sectors of the economy, 
which makes it incapable of contributing toward autonomous 
and sustained growth. 
In the advanced countries, one of the major exports 
is transportation goods; however, it constitutes only 15 
percent of the total commodities exported by the U.S. and 
17.6 percent in Japan in 1970. These percentages in 1973 
were 15.1 percent for the U.S. and 24.6 percent for Japan. 
In 1974, it was 14.8 percent for the U.S. and 24.1 percent 
for Japan. 
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1. Balance of payments 
Saudi Arabian balance of payments position indicates 
further the role of the foreign sector in its economy. The 
expansion of the export sector and the expansion of the 
mechanisms of expropriation which include both increasing 
rates of commodity imports from the western capitalist na­
tions and increasing rates of capital export clearly show 
this trend. 
The structure of the Saudi Arabian balance of payments 
. . . reflects the typical characteristics of an 
oil economy, i.e., predominance of the oil sector 
in financial developments and a limited home pro­
duction base. The net surplus of the oil sector 
accrues almost entirely to the public sector in 
the form of government oil revenues and is injected 
into the domestic income stream through the govern­
ment's domestic expenditures. Given the free and 
open Saudi Arabian economy and the limited supply of 
domestically produced goods and services, a major 
part of private sector income is translated quick­
ly into demand for foreign goods and services. Non-
oil current account receipts are small, with the 
exception of the recent growth in investment income 
on external assets, and recorded net capital move­
ments (excluding the oil sector) have also been 
relatively small in recent years. In this situa­
tion, the overall balance between the net surplus 
of the oil sector is against the net deficit of 
the non-oil private sector and government direct 
foreign exchange expenditures which have recently 
increased substantially. (International Monetary 
Fund, 1976, p. 48) 
Oil revenues are the major source of funds for financing 
consumption and investment in the economy. The acquisition 
of public expenditure is the basis of private enterprise in 
Saudi Arabia. Intra-class competition to capture the public 
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revenue became in effect consolidating rather than fragment­
ing class cohesion behind the ruling family. The basis of 
class power had been transformed since the integration in 
the world structure, from ownership of the means of produc­
tion to control of the means of allocation—namely the oil 
revenues. Since all oil revenue accrued directly to the 
ruler under the terms of the concession, the executive be­
came the appropriator of the new wealth. Revenue allocation 
through ministries transformed the articulation of economic 
and political power, and transformed the basis of power from 
control over the means of production to control over the 
means of allocation. In other words, the ruler and his 
council of ministers represent the executive branch of the 
political superstructure of an economic infrastructure based 
upon expropriation of the nation's oil resources. 
Table 12 reflects both the increases in imports and the 
capital transfers over the period 1963-1979. 
The growth of current account traced to the greater 
expansion of the oil sector and the rises in oil prices. At 
the same time, imports and capital transfers increased over­
whelmingly from 4,466 million SR (Saudi Riyal) in 1963 to over 
181,103 million in 1979—almost 41 times that of 1963. The 
growing outflows of capital reveal the narrow basis of the 
production forces that stem from the narrow specialization 
role in the world division of labor as an oil producer. 
Table 12. Balance of payments estimates,® 1963-79 (SR million) 
1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 
Current account 
1. Receipts 5,198 5,299 6,030 7,632 7,886 8 ,960 9 ,284 10 ,971 
Exports, f.o.b. 4,923 4,864 5,576 7,132 7,263 8 ,276 8 ,546 10 ,107 
Pilgrimage 180 239 256 266 284 324 423 459 
Miscellaneous 95 126 198 234 333 360 315 405 
2. Payments 4,460 4,608 5,589 7,038 7,475 9 ,509 9 ,819 10 ,688 
Imports 1,440 1,773 2,259 2,830 2,912 3 ,838 4 ,018 4 ,010 
Investment income 2,106 1,787 2,048 2,799 2,776 3 ,168 3 ,303 4 ,099 
Travel 176 198 243 302 374 428 468 554 
Government 
expenditures 243 315 342 365 621 1 ,215 1 ,251 1 ,206 
Other services 495 535 697 742 792 860 779 819 
Current account surplus 
(+) or deficit (-) (re­
ceipts less payments) +738 +639 +441 +594 +405 -549 -535 +283 
Capital account direct 
investment (- indi­
cates inflow) -50 -63 -243 -342 -167 -81 -22 -14 
Other capital (+ 
indicates outflow) -427 +272 +251 +663 +476 +5 -116 -199 
SAMA foreign assets 
(+ increase) +1,066 +401 +554 + 341 -124 -419 -442 +392 
Commercial bank net 
foreign assets +149 +27 -121 —68 +220 -54 +45 +104 
^Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) Statistical Summaries (197 5, 1976, 
1981) and Annual Reports (1977, 1979, 1980). 
Table 12. Continued 
Current account 
1. Receipts 
Exports, f.o.b. 
Pilgrimage 
Miscellaneous 
2. Payments 
Imports 
Investment income 
Travel 
Government 
expenditures 
Other services 
Current account surplus 
(+) or deficit (-) (re­
ceipts less payments) 
Capital account direct 
investment (- indi­
cates inflow) 
Other capital {+ 
indicates outflow) 
SAMA foreign assets 
(+ increase) 
Commercial bank net 
foreign assets 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
17,610 18,149 24,621 125,207 107,145 141,803 163,496 147,781 215,931 
16,647 16,809 22,542 118,585 97,761 127,824 144,284 127,597 192,520 
485 686 956 1,832 1,968 2,427 2,911 3,515 4,019 
478 654 1,124 4,790 7,466 11,552 16,301 16,669 19,342 
13,605 9,533 15,241 42,764 56,927 91,499 119,998 155,270 181,103 
4,226 5,488 7,576 13,490 24,282 43,987 60,709 79,636 92,526 
6,488 677 1,517 17,672 7,463 11,581 14,380 15,342 21,015 
649 743 1,050 1,317 2,238 3,568 4,992 10,580 12,902 
1,232 1,243 2,991 7,468 18,988 26,556 31,831 37,671 42,938 
1,010 1,332 2,107 2,817 3,956 5,796 8,086 12,041 11,722 
+4,005 +8,616 +9,380 +82,443 +50,268 +50,315 +43,498 -7,489 +34,828 
-490 -1,488 -226 -2,812 -4,431 -5,698 -3,755 -4,450 -4,040 
+850 +4,156 +4,422 +41,452 +23,547 +40,518 +40,044 +31,138 +33,850 
+3,542 +5,207 +5,235 +43,486 +30,685 +13,706 +2,426 -8,322 -4,725 
+103 +741 -51 +317 +467 +1,789 +2,784 +2,145 +4,243 
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and an expropriator of capital from Saudi Arabia to the 
centers of world capitalism. Through mechanism of expan­
sion of the consumer market, welfare state programs, 
foreign investment and surplus reserves, the entire economic 
infrastructure of Saudi Arabia has developed around activi­
ties that produce no value, but consume the surplus and 
sustain and enhance expropriation. 
Table 12 shows the oil export as the most important 
or major income to the country. From 1963 to 1979, oil's 
share of national income increases dramatically. It is 
interesting to note the strong relationship between export 
and import. Whenever there is an increase in export, there 
is an increase in import. In 17 years, the pattern was 
broken only three times. In 1970 and 1975, the imports did 
not respond to the change in export while there was an in­
crease in export. In 1970 and 1971, the import did not in­
crease. 
However, in 1975 when export decreased, the import 
increased. If we compare the payment on the investment in­
come and the inflow of capital investment, we find that 
every dollar invested can earn an average of $36.97 in re­
turn. This kind of profit leads not only to the outflow of 
capital, but it deprives the country of the expansion 
effect of the circulation of capital and reinvestment in 
other branches of the economy. 
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The outflow of capital, either as profit or as foreign 
investment, and private outflow has increased dramatically 
from 2,776 million in 1963 to 97,803 million in 1979. 
It is reported that one oil company alone (ARAMCO) had 
a current profit margin of between $1.20 and $1.30 a 
barrel, adding up to more than $4 billion per year at 
current rates of production (MERTP, 1980, p. 28). 
As one writer describes the disadvantage of exporting 
the profit and the outflow of capital, 
The oil companies, in the Arab oil producing 
countries were, until recently, completely 
owned by foreign capital, with the result that 
the profit from the export sector (the oil sec­
tor) was exported instead of being reinvested 
in the economy of the host country. 
The exported profit increased the accumula­
tion of capital in the industrialized Western 
country, creating an expansion and growth in 
the industrial sector. (Al-Bardeiy, 1981, p. 157) 
The investment in raw materials production in Arab countries 
. . . decreases in the growth impact of highly 
profitable returns of export sector on the other 
sectors of the economy. The diffusion of growth 
to the economic sectors is limited. The export 
sector (oil sector) was actually closed foreign 
sector representing a spearhead of advanced in­
dustrial countries in oil-producing Arab countries. 
This led to economic, social, and technological 
dualism in these countries (Al-Bardeiy, 1981, p. 157) 
The higher the ratio of exported commodities as a 
raw material, the higher the level of specialization and 
unequal exchange. 
In relations between the advanced countries 
and the rest, however, the complementary character 
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of the economies concerned, created by the mech­
anisms of specialization in the context of domi­
nation by the more highly developed economy. 
(Amin, 1976bf p. 152) 
So, in a world system characterized by unequal exchange, 
the periphery assigned a special role which is supplying 
primary products in exchange for manufactured goods (see 
footnote 1 in this chapter). 
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the only major exported 
commodity is oil and in its crude, not processed, form 
(Table 13). 
The higher the income of a state depends on a single 
exported commodity, the hig"her the level of externally 
dependent structure. 
In Saudi Arabia, the income of the state depends heav­
ily on oil revenues. Its contribution to the state treasury 
ran from 86 percent in 1970 to 97 percent in 1980 (Table 14). 
It is surprising to note that in 1980 the share of oil 
revenue became not only the dominant, but almost the only 
income to the state (Table 15). In spite of the goals 
of the two developmental plans (1970-75 and 1975-80), which 
aim to diversify the economy, the survival of the whole 
country depends largely on a single commodity which is so 
vulnerable to the world market fluctuation. As what hap­
pens these days, the demand lags behind supply,, caus­
ing the prices of oil to drop sharply and forcing Saudi 
Table 13. Proportion of crude oil to total oil exported^ 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980^ 1981^ 
Crude (m.b.d.) 4.19 5.45 7.01 7.91 6.59 8.04 8.59 7.69 8.80 
Refined oil as 
percentage of 
crude 12.70 10.50 8.30 7.30 7.30 7.00 6.00 6.40 5.10 5.60 6.00 
% of oil ex­
ported as a 
crude 87.30 89.50 91.70 92.70 92.70 93.00 94.00 93.60 94.90 94.40 94.00 
^Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1980, 1981); Saudi Arabian Government, 
Ministry of Finance and National Economy (1974, 1980). 
^International Monetary Fund (1982, 1983). 
Table 14. The share of oil revenue to total income of the state 
1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
86% 92% 94% 96% 90% 90% 89% 89% 97.6% 96.7% 97.9% 
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Table 15. Government 
lions of U. 
revenues from oil 
S. dollars^ 
(1946-1980) in mil-
Year Source Total 
ARAMCO Others 
1946 10.4 10.4 
1950 56.7 — — 56.7 
1955 338.2 2.6 340.8 
1960 312.8 20.9 333.7 
1965 618.7 45.4 664.1 
1966 745.8 44.1 789.9 
1967 853.2 50.4 903.6 
1968 872.0 54.4 926.4 
1969 895.1 54.1 949.2 
1970 1,148.4 65.6 1,214.0 
1971 1,806.4 78.5 1,884.9 
1972 2,643.2 101.4 2,744.6 
1973 4,195.0 145.0 4,340.0 
1974 22,375.0 198.5 22,573.5 
1975 24,838.6 928.6 25,676.2 
1976 29,937.3 817.6 30,754.9 
1977 35,703.8 836.3 36,540.1 
1978 31,609.0 624.8 32,233.8 
1979 47,588.9 846.3 48,435.2 
1980 82,716.4 1,750.0 84,466.4 
^Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAI4A) , Annual Reports 
(1975); and Statistical Summaries (1981). 
Arabia to cut some of its budget allocations and to borrow 
from its reserve. 
2. Trade partners 
Amin asserted that less developed, peripheral countries 
assumed the satellite position to the center countries, do­
ing most of their trade with the center countries, and 
supplying them with raw primary products (raw materials. 
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agricultural products) and importing finished goods and 
services. 
In this section, the indicators of the concentration 
of import and export direction are presented. 
Export to the advanced countries 
Total export 
Import from the advanced countries _ 
Total import 
The higher the concentration of export and import direction, 
the higher the satellite position and dépendent the 
country concerned. 
Table 16. Saudi Arabia export direction,^ percent 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
U.S.A. 15.7 9.5 15.7 17.2 
Japan 20.2 19.0 20.2 17.3 
W. Europe 37.3 39.5 37.3 40.3 
Canada 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.9 
Total of advanced 
countries 74.6 69.4 74.6 76.7 
Middle East 3.5 3.7 3.5 3.6 
Asia (except Japan) 13.8 11.8 13.8 12.8 
Africa .6 .6 .6 1.01 
Other 7.5 14.5 7.5 5.8 
100 100 100 100 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1980, 1981); Saudi 
Arabian Government, Ministry of Finance and National 
Economy (1980, 1981). 
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As was expected by the model set forth by Amin, more 
than three-fourths of the Saudi Arabian exports were chan­
neled towards the industrialized developed countries of 
the West and Japan, while the trade with the other less 
developed peripheral countries was negligible. From the 
following table (Table 17) and the preceding discussion, 
Saudi Arabia exports to the industrialized world only crude 
oil, which also conforms to the quantity and quality pre­
dicted by Sarair Amin's model. 
When we turn our attention to the import direction, 
we expect to see the same pattern: high import concentra­
tion from the advanced countries of the West and Japan. 
Table 17. Geographical origin of imports^ (% share of 
country/region) 
1973 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
U.S.A. 19.1 23.3 20.9 18.6 20.9 20.9 20.9 
Japan 15.4 20.9 15.4 11.6 15.4 16.2 11.17 
W. Europe 28.4 32.2 43.9 36.9 43.9 43.4 42.2 
Total of 
advanced 
countries 62.9 76.4 79.3 67.1 80.2 79.0 80.1 
Middle East 21.2 — 4.0 14.0 4.0 4.2 
Africa 2.4 — 1.0 .9 1.0 1.2 
Asia (ex­
cept Japan) 7.5 — 10.0 8.7 10.0 10.6 
Other 6.0 23.6 5.7 9.3 4.8 5.0 19.9 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
^Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy (1974, 1980, 1981); Saudi Arabian Mone­
tary Agency (1980, 1981). 
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It is not surprising to find that 80.1 percent of im­
ports in 1980 came from the center of gravity, the U.S., 
Japan, and W. Europe. Less than 20 percent of all imports 
came from the rest of the world. What is really surprising 
is the decline of Saudi Arabian trade with other Arab 
countries, from 21.2 percent to 4.2 percent in 1979, which 
supposedly complement each other economically, especially 
when there was an agreement on such cooperation. But it 
seems that the other Arab countries are also dependent 
peripheral countries and have the same role in this world 
system as that of Saudi Arabia. 
The case of Saudi Arabia, therefore, did not deviate 
from the pattern of the peripheral development where she 
imports most of her needs, especially capital and consumer 
goods, from the advanced countries. 
The composition of the Saudi Arabian imports in 1978 
(see Table 18) confirms the growing proportion of capital 
goods and consumer manufacturers. And this, in turn, is 
in conformity with the general model of periphery capital­
ist development. It places heavy emphasis on importing 
capital goods and consumer luxurious goods. In fact, near­
ly all the capital goods were imported, as were the con­
sumer goods, which explains the backward stage of develop­
ment in this particular country. 
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Table 18. The composition of Saudi Arabian imports in 197 8^ 
Percent 
Consumer manufacturers 40.9 
Capital goods 41.5 
Chemicals 3.5 
Food products 4 . 8 
Crude materials 2.7 
Others 2.1 
100.0 
Bgaudi Arabian Government/ Ministry of Planning (1980); 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1981); Saudi Arabian Govern­
ment, Chamber of Commerce (1982). 
It is a clear case of unequal exchange where Saudi 
2 Arabia exports crude oil and imports manufactured goods, 
and it is a case of technological dependency. 
The monopoly of technology by the advanced world and 
their multinational corporation has indeed put the less de­
veloped countries in a disadvantaged position. They control 
the direction of development and drain the wealth of the na­
tion. Peripheral countries either comply with this situa­
tion and become more and more dependent or look for a new 
path of development which will grant them a self-reliance 
development. 
^Johan Galtung (1971) compares two countries, in ex­
change one producing oil, and the other producing processed 
goods. The first one lacked advantage internally and ex­
ternally. Internally, it lacks the spin-off effects to 
other sectors—culture, knowledge, technology, etc. , and 
externally it suffers unequal exchange. While the second 
one which produced processed goods gains from the exchange 
externally and internally. 
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The role of imports in consumption and in production 
is much greater when the volume of imports related to agri­
cultural and industrial production, and capital formation. 
Table 19 depicts the case of Saudi Arabia from 1975-1980 
and gives an indication of how the economy depends on the 
outside world. 
Import 
Agr. production + indust. production + capital formation 
Table 19. Share of imports in production and consumption^ 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Capital formation 
Agriculture 
Industry 
12.7 
1.0 
5.1 
20.4 
1.0 
4.9 
25.0 
.9 
4.4 
29.8 
1.7 
4.4 
31.5 
1.7 
5.1 
24.7 
1.2 
4.4 
Imports 10.6 18.7 25.3 30.9 43.2 30.1 
Imports 
Ag + Ind + CF 0.56 0.71 0.83 0.86 1.12 0.99 
^Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1980, 1981). 
The ratio between imports and GDP has increased from 
10.6 percent in 1975 to 43.2 percent in 1979. But the 
exceptional importance of Saudi Arabian imports relative 
to the volume of agricultural and industrial production 
and investment, as shown in Table 19, which jumped from 56 
percent in 1975 to 99 percent in 1980, expresses the high 
level of penetration of the economies of Saudi Arabia and 
the developed world in regard to structure of the 
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development and to the organization of the production 
process. In other words, the Saudi Arabian economy is 
more externally oriented and, therefore, dependent. 
B. The Structure of the Model of Development and 
the Organization of the Productive Processes 
Uneven development includes (1) uneven sectoral pro­
ductivity and (2) uneven regional development. 
1. Uneven productivity among sectors 
The capitalist mode of production in the periphery has 
not taken hold of all the branches of production as it has 
at the center. This will lead to a big divergence of the 
organic composition of capital (amount of capital used per 
worker). 
That divergence expresses the uneven degree of modern­
ization or penetration by the capitalist mode of production. 
Thus, uneven productivity is often reflected in unequal 
rates of profit and unequal rewards of labor, such as the 
case when sectors do not belong to the capitalist mode, 
as in rural areas production. Amin notes that what dis­
tinguished the capitalist mode of production is 
The mobility of the factors, that is, the exist­
ence of a market for labor and for capital, the 
effective tendency is for labor and capital to 
be rewarded in all branches at the same rates. 
If, however, this price structure, correspond­
ing at the center to homogeneous rewards for 
labor and capital, is transferred to the periphery. 
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the result will be that the factors cannot be 
rewarded at the same rate in the different 
branches if the technical conditions (and so 
the productivity) are distributed otherwise 
than at the center. (Amin, 1976b). 
However, Amin recognizes that sectoral productivity is 
unevenly distributed at the center, but it is not as great 
as in the periphery. 
a. Distribution of sectoral productivity in Saudi 
Arabia The comparison of the ratios of productivity 
between agriculture sector and oil sectors (the export sec­
tor) should indicate the level of development or underde­
velopment. The agriculture sector (including forestry and 
fishing) is the main economic activity of the rural areas, 
which does not belong to capitalist mode. The export sec­
tor (oil) is the dominant and highly modern capital in­
tensive sector, which is the "expression of capitalist 
development in the periphery—the result of investment of 
capital by the center" (Amin, •1976b). 
Data show the extreme differences in the ratios of pro­
ductivity observed between agriculture and export sector 
1:75 in 1975 and 1:62 in 1980 (see Table 20). 
The agricultural share in GDP declined from 9 percent 
in 1963 to 1.2 percent in 1980. This decline may be partly 
due to the decrease of the rural population. However, the 
agriculture sector still holds the largest share in the 
employment of the labor force, while oil sector employment 
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Table 20. Percent share in GDP (current prices)^ 
Agriculture Oil 
1963 
1965 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
b 9.0 
8.5 
1.0 
1.0 
0.9 
1.0 
1 . 1  
1.2 
54.0 
44,0 
75.0 
6 6 . 6  
6 2 . 6  
65.4 
53.2 
62.5 
^Computed from SAMA Statistical Summaries (1981), 
SAMA Annual Report (1980). 
^Issawi (1982). 
is still almost the same percentage of employment (see 
Table 21). 
Table 21. Employment in agriculture and oil sector (in 
thousands)^ 
1963^ 1965b % 1970° % 1975^ % 1980d % 
Agri­
culture 61% 464. 8 46.2 445.8 40.4 645 39.8 598.8 24.2 
Oil 2% 14.0 1.4 13.4 1.2 27.4 1.6 36.0 1.5 
fissawi (1982, p. 231). 
"Sayigh (1978, p. 140). 
Cgaudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning (1975-
1980, p. 19). 
dSaudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning (1980-
1985, p. 37, 93). 
Forty percent of the labor force produced only 1.0 per­
cent of the GDP in 1975, while only 1.6 percent of employed 
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persons produced 75 percent of Gross Domestic Product. 
This situation did not change much in 1980 where the share 
of agriculture to GDP remained very small—1.2 percent. 
However, the most striking situation is that the productiv­
ity of agriculture since 1975 remains almost the same, 
while the agricultural share of employment is declining from 
40 to 24 percent. It is the disguised employment which 
characterized the subsistence agriculture in Saudi Arabia. 
The migration from the farm and rural areas to urban 
centers—in 1980, 54 percent of the total population lived 
in towns and cities, 42 percent in metropolitan centers 
with a population over 100,000, while 46 percent lived in 
the rural areas. This is in contrast to 1970, when approxi­
mately 36 percent of the population lived in urban areas 
(Saudi Arabian Government, Third Development Plan, 1980). 
The migration from farms was not a result of rising 
productivity in agriculture through the greater use of capi­
tal and less labor per unit of output as happened in de­
veloped countries, but was a result of the distortion of 
the traditional mode and the collapse of pre-capitalist 
relations of production. The destruction through competi­
tion from imported goods brought about retrogression to 
rural economy crafts and farm production, and a great part 
of the labor force was thrown out of the productive system. 
Saudi Arabian society lost its traditional character 
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and became dependent on an export sector, which is char­
acterized by its highly developed and highly profitable 
return. Agriculture became less important and less reward­
ing. The result is an urbanization without industrializa­
tion and more dependence on imported agricultural products 
to feed the urban population. 
The development that aggravated the internal conditions 
by increasing divergence between sectoral productivity 
within the economy will make it i.mpossible for the develop­
ment of integrated complementarities within an autonomous 
economy, which is the condition necessary for an independent 
development. 
2. Uneven regional development 
Independent development presupposed integrated develop­
ment sectors and regions alike. Integration would ensure 
the national cohesion of the country and decrease social 
inequality. 
Peripheral dependent development, characterized by 
the disarticulation of the society, concentration of wealth 
in a few towns, and prosperity in regions where the export 
and imports activities are greatest, aggravates existing 
distortion, especially between town and country (Amin, 1976b, 
p. 212). 
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a. Indicators of uneven regional development in Saudi 
Arabia The predominance of traditional agriculture in 
the rural areas of Saudi Arabia, especially in the south­
western and northern areas, has been characterized by low 
productivity (see the previous section) and low profita­
bility, and a high rate of outward migration (Saudi Arabian 
Government, Third Development Plan, 1980). In these rural 
areas, between 60 to 70 percent of the population engage in 
the low productivity occupation and hence they have a lower 
income. 
The traditional economic system is mainly 
operative in rural areas and small towns while 
the modem economic system operates out of 
metropolitan centers. This system led to a 
general rural-urban imbalance in development and 
to the creation of regional imbalance as well. 
Infrastructure development has tended to have 
an urban bias up to the present and rural stress 
has been, relatively speaking, neglected. At the 
same time, industry tended to concentrate in the 
so-called "central corridor" of Saudi Arabia 
(Jeddah, Mecca, Taif-Riyadh, Hofuf and Dammam) 
with Jubail, Yanbu and Madinah as outposts. As 
a result, migration into the central corridor 
cities is very high. Meanwhile, the north and 
the south of the kingdom risk a probably depopu­
lation and decline. (Cole, 1981, p. 135) 
In the Eastern region where the export sector is lo­
cated (oil), 90.7 percent of the GDP comes from oil, and 
their share of the other economic activities is only 9.3 
percent. But the importance of this region to the whole 
economy of Saudi Arabia is indicated by the large share of 
the oil sector on the GDP, which is as high as 62.5 percent 
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in 1980. Concentration on a few towns at the expense of the 
rest of the country is clear from the changing distribution 
of population. In 1970, approximately 64 percent of the pop­
ulation lived in the rural areas while in 1980 only 46 per­
cent (Saudi Arabian Government, Third Development Plan, 1980, 
p. 14) . 
Table 22. Distribution of total population (percent)^ 
1970 1975 1980 
Percentage of population living 
in metropolitan centers (pop. 
more than 100,000) 20 35 42 
Percentage living in small towns 20 16 12 
Percentage living in rural areas 60 49 46 
asaudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning Esti­
mate, Third Development Plan (1980, p. 56). 
In 1974, 31.75 percent of the total population lived in 
seven cities, and in a 1980 estimate, they reached 45 percent 
(see Table 23). In Riyad, the capital, the average annual 
increase from 1964 to 1974 is 24.3 percent. In 1974, 9.5 
percent of the total national population lived at Riyad. 
The 19 83 estimate of Riyad population exceeds one million. 
The cities of Dairanan-AlKhubar-Dharan were established 
mainly to serve the export sector (oil industry). Migra­
tion from other parts of the country, especially the central 
and the southwestern, and of foreign workers to this region 
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Table 23. Increased populations in principal towns (esti­
mate ) ^ 
Town 1962 1970 1974 
Riyad 170,000 350,000 666,840 
Jeddah 148,000 250,000 561,104 
Mecca 159,000 300,000 366,801 
Taif 54,000 100,000 204,866 
Medina 72,000 85,000 198,186 
Dammam 35,000 40,000 127,844 
Hofuf 115,000 130,000 155,596 
^Ahmed Al-Shamikh (.1979, p. 93). 
was in response to the growth of export sector. Riyad, the 
capital, the place of government bureaucrats and the power 
elites, and Jeddah, the port of imports and commercial 
class, probably now account for more than 30-35 percent of 
the total population. 
The growth of these urban centers was the product of 
oil expansion—even though not functionally in a direct 
way, but indirectly through the revenue derived from oil. 
Urbanization in Saudi Arabia is not built on real urban 
economy, but on urbanization without industrialization. 
Most of the urban activities in these urban centers are in 
the service sector. Investment is channeled toward nonpro­
ductive activities, such as trade and consumption, building 
and construction, and this and other activities that pro­
duced quick profit such as land speculation rather than 
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investment in industrial complex (Said Rajab, 1980, p. 40). 
Birks and Sinclair pointed out that: 
Saudi Arabian development has proceeded along 
dual economy lines. The modern sectors have 
forged ahead in enclave industries and primate 
urban centers. The rural agriculture sector 
has remained relatively traditional and sub-
sis tence-based, but for occasional large-scale 
agricultural projects. These are only of small 
overall impact. These two facets of the econ­
omy—the modern, urban sector and the rural, 
traditional, largely subsistence sector—are 
associated with two separate labor markets. A 
large proportion of the Saudi Arabian national 
work-force has not participated in modern-sector 
development, but has remained in the traditional 
sector. (Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 107) 
The survival of the rural, traditional way of life was 
because 
The industrial sector in Saudi Arabia was much 
smaller and did not carry the same momentum of 
growth. . . . The drift to the towns was creat­
ing problems in urban areas, where under- and 
unemployment of Saudi nationals were extensive. 
(Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. 109) 
The modern and traditional labor markets are not com­
pletely independent. 
The two do interact, but in a particular way. 
Members of the traditional sector do join the 
modern, industrial or formally employed labor 
force, but only in an informal and part-time 
manner. Rural males have become short-term 
periodic migrant labourers, making temporary 
migration, from their villages to the urban 
areas in search of employment, while their 
familites stay at home. The rewards from these 
short-term periods of employment sustain the 
otherwise declining traditional economy which 
is ostensibly subsistence rather than cash-crop 
oriented. (Birks and Sinclair, 1980, p. Ill) 
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In Saudi Arabia's case, the rapidity of modern 
economic development from such a small base has 
resulted in the majority of the country becoming, 
•effectively, as massive periphery to the main 
central belt of development. Moves toward regional 
development and a more widespread provision of 
industry will serve to reduce this in the future, 
and will diminish the differential between the two 
presently existing facets of the economy. (Birks 
and Sinclair, 1980, p. 112) 
3. Distortion toward unproductive activities 
The relative proportions contributed to GDP by the ag-
3 
riculture, industry, and service sectors, is often con­
sidered to be a measure of the degree of development or 
underdevelopment of an economy. Bourgeois economists argue 
that as a country develops, the share of the agriculture 
sector in the total GDP will diminish in favor of the in­
dustry sector, with yet further progress being manifested in 
a shift from the industry to the service sector. This has 
been the historical process in the now advanced capitalist 
countries and is wrongly used to describe what is happening 
now in the underdeveloped world.^ 
Their composition is as follows: agriculture (primary 
sector): agriculture, hunting, fishing, forestry, and min­
ing. Industry (secondary sector); manufacturing electricity 
and water supply, construction. Services (tertiary sector): 
wholesale and retail trade, restaurant, and hotels. Trans­
port and communication, finance and business services. Pub­
lic administration. 
^See, for example, the detailed structural analysis of 
a developed and an underdeveloped country by Simon Kuzuets. 
Also Modernization analysis such as Wilbert Moore—Social 
change, etc. 
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The important difference between developed and under­
developed countries is that in the developed countries, the 
movement of the active population away from agriculture in­
to industry came out of the rising productivity in agri­
culture through the greater use of capital and less labor 
per unit of output. This shift was accompanied by an in­
crease in per capita income that raised the demand for con­
sumer goods. In the underdeveloped countries, this driving 
force is absent since the main emphasis is on exports and 
luxury consumption goods and the productivity of labor in 
agriculture and the profits are not improving appreciably. 
In other words, "In the central model, industry, as it 
develops, provides work for a larger number of workers. . . . 
Industry recruits from declining agriculture and from the 
natural increase in the population" (Amin, 1976b, pp. 240-
241). The historical process of growth in the now developed 
capitalist countries was the contribution of the agriculture 
sector to total GDP, and its share of employment declined 
while the size of the industry sector increased. The service 
sector increased less rapidly than the industry in the early 
phase of growth. 
In the periphery countries, on the other hand, the 
process of growth is somewhat different. While the share of 
the agriculture sector is declining, the expansion is taking 
place more in the service than in the industrial sector, so 
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that the "occupied section of the nonagricultural population 
went into the tertiary rather than the secondary sector, and 
this happened from the beginning of the process of modern 
urban growth, in connection with integration into the world 
capitalist system" (Amin, 1976b, p. 240). 
Rather than indicating a sign of rapid progress, this 
phenomenon shows the distorted structure of the economy in­
sofar as the expansion of nonproductive activities does not 
come out of rising productivity of labor in agriculture, 
but out of the export orientation of the economy. 
In summation, the historical process of the center and 
the periphery is different. So that (1) "in the advanced 
countries, the share of the secondary sector is close to 
that of the tertiary, whereas in all the underdeveloped 
countries the share is much smaller"; (2) in terms of 
distribution of occupied population among sectors, the 
advanced countries show that "it is distributed more or less 
equally between the secondary and tertiary sectors. . . 
whereas in all the underdeveloped countries the proportion 
of the labor force engaged in tertiary activities is very 
much greater than that engaged in secondary sector" (Amin, 
1976b, p. 234). 
The reason of the hypertrophy of the tertiary sector, 
according to Amin, 
. . . lies in the conditions governing the inte­
gration of precapitalist societies into the 
115 
international capitalist market, an integration 
that entails three main consequences: 
First, competition by the industries of the 
dominant centers prevents the local capital that 
is accumulated from making its way into invest­
ment in industry, and diverts this capital into 
complementary activities connected with the ex­
port economy, especially commerce. 
Second, the hypertrophy of certain tertiary 
activities with low productivity (small-scale 
retail trade, various services, etc.) is a mani­
festation of concealed unemployment, resulting 
from the process of marginalization that are 
specific to the development of peripheral capi­
talism. 
Third, the strengthening of the position of 
ground rent, a characteristic result of the 
international integration of the peripheral 
formation, also entails a particular orientation 
ôf the spending of income5. . . such spending is 
a luxury expenditure that is focused . . . upon 
imported goods and . . . services (servants, 
leisure services, etc.). (Amin, 1976b, pp. 245-
246) 
4. The sectoral distribution of output 
in Saudi Arabia 
From Table'24, we will derive a three sector table to 
match the theoretical statement put forward by Amin—primary, 
secondary, and tertiary sectors; then we will try to find 
out whether the result would support Amin's claim. 
Excluding oil sector^, the sectoral distribution in 
Ground rent does not necessarily have to be saved, as 
profit on capital must be, in order to be invested in the 
modernization that competition makes necessary, for it is an 
income derived from monopoly, and can therefore be spent in 
its entirety (Amin, 1976b, p. 246). 
^The exclusion of the oil sector is justified for many 
reasons: (1) it is run and operated by multinational 
corporation, (2) its role is as an enclave and it employs a 
small number of Saudis, and after all, this study analyzes 
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Table 24. Sectoral distribution (constant prices) exclud­
ing oil sector {% of GDP) 
1967& 1970^ 1976^ 1977^ 1979^ 1979^ 1980^ 1985^ 
Primary 
sector 14.5 13.2 9.6 7.4 7.4 7.2 6.7 3.6 
Secondary 
sector 21.2 21.0 28.7 31.0 24.0 28.8 28.9 31.8 
Tertiary 
sector 64.3 65.8 61.7 61.5 64.1 64.0 64.4 64.6 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
^Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning (1980). 
Saudi Arabian Government, Monetary Agency, Statistical 
Summaries (1981). 
°Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning, Third 
Development Plan (1980-1985), p. 95. 
Saudi Arabia is very similar to the one described above. Al­
though output in the agriculture sector has risen in abso­
lute terms from 1976 to 1980, its relative contribution to 
GDP declined rapidly from 14.5 percent in 1967 to 6.7 per­
cent in 1980. The secondary sector, even though its contri­
bution rose from 21.2 to 31 percent in 1977 and then fell to 
28.9 percent in 1980, is still influenced by the construc­
tion sector, as a result of government's involvement in 
building the infrastructure. Most of the secondary sector 
activities, 75.1 percent, were in construction in 1977 and 
68.5 percent in 1980. The composition of construction needs 
the effects of extraversion on the economy and that includes 
the oil sector, of course. 
Table 25. Saudi Arabia's Gross Domestic Product by economic activities in 
constant prices from 1965-1980^ 
Type of economic 
activity 
Million riyals 
1965 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 
Mining and quarrying: 
(8.3) (3.7) 
1221 
(3.5) 
1282 
(3.2) 
1483 
(3.5) 
1550 
(3.5) 
1639 
(3-3) 
Crude petroleum and 17510 19852 19650 20112 21652 
natural gas (43. 9) (54. 6) (50.8) (50.1) (46.7) (44.8) (44.1) 
Other minerals 112 134 147 125 128 
(0. 3) (0. 3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3) 
Manufacturing: 1359 1523 1591 1689 1795 
Petroleum refining (6. 2) (4. 1) (3.9) (3.8) (3.8) (3.-8) (3.7) 
Other manufacturing 828 956 1103 1276 1477 
(1. 8) (2. 3) (2.4) (2.4) (2.6) (2.8) (3.0) 
Electricity, gas and water 345 414 546 725 868 
(1. 1) (1. 0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.3) (1.6) (1.8) 
Construction 3309 4146 4582 4700 5091 
(5. 2) (7. 8) (9.6) (10.5) (10.9) (10.5) (10.4) 
Commerce, restaurants. 2331 
hotels (7. 1) (6. 0) (6.8) 
Transport, storage and 1580 1929 3367 2729 3031 
communications (6. 9) (4. 1) (4.6) (4.9) (5.6) (6.1) (6.2) 
Services : 
Ownership of dwellings (4. 2) (5. 2) 
1933 
(5.6) 
Others (6. 6) (1. 8) 
675 
(2.0) 
Community services (5. 7) (1. 0) 
363 
(1.1) 
Less bank charges (-0. 2) (-0.2) 
Subtotal GDP (91. 3) (91. 7) (91.4) 
Government services (8. 7) (8. 3) 
2755 
(8.0) 
34461 
100. 0 100. 0 100.0 
^Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1981, pp. 
Ministry of Planning (1970), p. 19. 
2276 2549 
(5.7) (6.1) 
744 413 
(2.0) (2.2) 
413 470 
(1.0) (1.1) 
(-0.2) (-0.3) 
(92.0) (92.3) 
2813 2953 
(7.1) (7.1) 
39668 42028 
100.0 100.0 
2804 3084 
(6.2) (6.3) 
1072 1222 
(2.4) (2.4) 
534 611 
(1.2) (1.2) 
1 o
 
(-0.5) 
(92.3) (92.6) 
3130 3333 
(7.0) (6.8) 
44838 49127 
100.0 100.0 
99-100); Saudi Arabian Government, 00 
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further scrutiny. Most of it was oriented toward final con­
sumption and nonproductive activities. There is a larger 
share of luxury buildings. 
Industrialization in Saudi Arabia is far from being a 
reality. Its contribution is still very small, estimated 
around 3-5 percent of the total GDP, and there is almost no 
capital goods manufacturing, and large share of the luxury 
goods or light industry. 
The average annual contribution of the service sector 
from 1967 to 1980 is 63.7 percent, which is very high indeed. 
However, while the productive activity declined from 38.4 in 
1977 to 35.6 in 1980, the service sector still maintained 
its role as the largest sector in gaining its momentum and 
grew from 61.7 in 1976 to 64.4 percent in 1980. 
Table 26. Percent share of production and service activi­
ties in GDP 
1967^ 1970® 1976^ 1977^ 1978% 1979^ 1980% 1985° 
Productive 
activity 35.7% 34.2% 38.3% 38.4% 36.4% 36.0% 35.6% 35.4% 
Service 
sector 64.3% 65.8% 61.7% 61.5% 64.1% 64.0% 64.4% 64.6% 
^Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning (1975-
1980, p. 19) . 
bsaudi Arabian Monetary Agency (1981). 
°Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning (1980-
1985). - . 
The productive activity in the sense of exploiting 
nature for man's benefit is losing ground in favor of 
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nonproductive ones in Saudi Arabia. This is nicely noted by 
the Third Development Plan which stated that "The growth of 
GDP as a whole did not stem mainly from new productive 
enterprises in agriculture and industry, but from 'through­
put ' sectors which by their nature could offer no long term 
potential alternatives to oil" (Saudi Arabian Government, 
Ministry of Planning, Third Development Plan, 1980-1985, p. 15) . 
M. Shahid Alam (1982) described the Saudi's economy as 
being "a prominently service-oriented economy" characterized 
by "expansion in oil financed government expenditure" which 
leads to "(i) disproportionately large service sector which 
is manned moreover by an immigrant labor force, (ii) a rela­
tively small commodity sector in which petrochemicals and 
allied industries are likely to be an important component, 
and (iii) agricultural sector" (p. 210). 
M. Shahid Alam (1982) put the sectoral distribution of 
GDP in the nonoil sector including construction in the 
service sector. This supports the proposition even further 
(see Table 27). 
The data support Amin's theoretical proposition, which 
describes the peripheral development as distorted structure 
in favor of nonproductive direction. 
5. The sectoral distribution of employment 
Employment in the three sectors shows a similar pattern 
in the relative proportion among the three sectors. 
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Table 27. Percent of sectoral distribution of GDP^ 
1962 1965 1968 1971 1974 1977 
to to to to to to 
1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978. 
1. Agriculture 20.20 15.10 12.90 12.16 8.90 6.66 
2. Mining and quarrying 
(excluding petroleum 
and natural gas) 0.40 0.56 0.50 0.50 0.60 0.70 
3. Manufacturing 
(excluding oil 
refining) 3.60 3.60 4.20 4.90 5.50 5.34 
4. Services 75.80 80.70 83.10 82.50 85.00 87.30 
^M. Shahid Alam (1982, p. 215). 
Agricultural employment declined rapidly over the entire 
period, from 66 percent in 1962 to 26 percent in 1980, 
and it is projected to decline even further by 1985 to 22.3 
percent. The secondary sector, however, witnessed a small 
change from 10 percent in 1962 to 18.9 percent in 1980. 
But again, the major influence in this gain is the construc­
tion activities which accounted for an average of 75 percent 
of the employment in the secondary sector. The construction 
sector, by its nature, is not a stable activity, but is 
affected a great deal by different variables. The major 
one is the export sector. The expansion or decline of oil 
export affects the whole economy through the revenue derived 
from it, which in turn influences the government decision to 
invest or not to invest. 
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The service sector is becoming larger and larger since 
1962, the employment jumps from 24 percent to the projected 
60.3 percent of the total employment. The decline of agri­
culture sector meant an increase in the service sector but 
not in the secondary sector as the historical experience of 
the West showed. The distortion of pre-capitalist relations 
in the rural areas and the ruin of crafts and local industry 
force great numbers of people to seek employment in the 
service sector in the government, or in a certain tertiary 
activity with low productivity (such as small-scale retail 
trade, taxi drivers^, and various services) (see Table 28). 
Table 28. Employment structure by aggregated sectors, 196 2-
1985 (percentage of total employment) 
. 1962^ 1965^ 1970C,d 1975e 19736 1930® ^^i^gga^'^ 
Primary (ag­
riculture 
and mining) 66.0 48.7 42.8 41.6 36.0 26.0 22.3 
Secondary 10.0 15.2 17.0 15.0 16.0 18.9 17.4 
Tertiary 24.0 36.1 40.2 43.4 48.0 55.2 60.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
^Birks and Sinclair (1979); Keir and El Sayed (1982). 
bsayigh (1978, p. 140). 
S audi Arabian Government Ministry of Planning, 
Second Development Plan (1975-1980); U.S. Department of 
Labor (1972, pp. 26-40). 
^Charles Issawi (1982, p. 231) listed the employment 
distribution in 1970 as follows: Agriculture, 61; Industry, 
10; Service, 29. 
®Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Planning, Third 
Development Plan (1980-1985). 
7The nomad pattern of employment is concentrated on em­
ployment in National Guard or as a taxi driver (Ibrahim, 
1982; Halliday, 1978). 
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D. Cole (1981) noted that the construction sector and 
the traditional service sectors are more or less straddling 
the traditional and modern economic system where "the con­
struction sector draws manpower from the traditional system 
and employs it in development of the modern system" while 
Many of the service functions of the modern sys­
tems, especially trade and transportation, are 
provided by enterprises, from the traditional 
economic system using labor-intensive, low 
capital, small-scale and relatively inefficient 
ways, yet receiving great cash income because 
of the high demand from the modern system. Both 
the construction sector and the traditional 
service sectors essentially draw manpower out of 
the traditional productive sector of agriculture 
and pastoralism without transmitting it into modern 
productive sectors. Instead, it is kept in economi­
cally inefficient but relatively well-paid employ­
ment. (Cole, 1981, pp. 134-135) 
Cole also pointed to the fact that the greater majority 
of the Saudi labor force engaged in "through-put rather 
than productive output sector. This leaves only 8 percent 
of the Kingdom's labor force to be engaged in productive 
output sectors" (Cole, 1981, p. 135) . Cole emphasized the 
risk by which "the traditional productive system replaced 
with non-productive sector of the population that will have 
to be supported by welfare" (Cole, 1981, p. 135). 
The marginalization of the Bedouin is documented by 
scholars such as Ibrahim and Cole (1978) and Cole (1981). 
The economic significance of the Bedouin in Saudi life 
. . . has undergone dramatic change in recent 
decades. Bedouin owners of huge herds of camels. 
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Table 29. Percent of productive 
ment^ 
employment to total employ-
1962 1965 1970 1975 1978 1980 1985 
Productive 
activities 76.0 63.9 69.8 56.6 52.0 44.9 39.7 
Services 24.0 36.1 40.2 43.4 48.0 55.2 60.3 
^Derived from the previous table. 
sheep and goats in pre-oil times, accounted for 
the greatest wealth of the nation. Their im­
portant economic role, however, has been eclipsed 
in the last quarter of a century by the wealth 
derived from oil, and in terms of manpower, the 
Bedouin are far from being incorporated into mod­
ern economic sectors. 
The Bedouin economy still is based on sub­
sistence-oriented herding and their herds are more 
like fixed assets than like transactional market 
commodities. Thus, despite their numbers and the 
absolute value of their animal wealth, the Bedouin 
are marginal to modern Saudi economy. The non-
utilization of manpower, moreover, constitutes a 
most serious problem in a country like Saudi Arabia 
which is experiencing an immense labor shortage. 
(Ibrahim and Cole, 1978, pp. 3-4) 
Understanding the Bedouin situation in contemporary 
Arabia can be seen within the wider socio-economic context 
as Cole (1981) put it: "What is perhaps most difficult to­
day is that the wider socio-economic context within which 
the Bedouin operate is itself related to the wider inter­
national world of capitalization of which it is a peripheral 
or marginal appendage" (Cole, 1981, p. 133). The substand­
ard socio-economic conditions of the Bedouin in comparison 
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with the rest of the Saudi population are documented in the 
Ibrahim and Cole (1978) study and in Cole (1981). 
In the Arabian Shield-South, an area of 202,000 square 
kilometers in the interior part of southwestern Saudi 
Arabia, Cole (1981) found that 
.  .  . 7 2  p e r c e n t  o f  t h e  t o t a l  e m p l o y e d  p o p u l a ­
tion engaged in traditional agriculture (includ­
ing pastoralism). Construction and transporta­
tion employ 5 percent of the labor force. The 
remainder are engaged, primarily, in traditional 
retail and service activities. Professional work­
ers account for only 3 percent of the labor force, 
clerical workers for 4 percent and managerial 
workers only 0.2 percent. The percentage in­
volved in the traditional labor force is well 
above the national average . . . but it is repre­
sentative of the situation in rural areas in 
general. (Cole, 1981, p. 137) 
In this area. 
The highest degree of illiteracy is found among 
people living at waterpoints—96 percent of all 
people 10 years old or older are illiterate as 
opposed to the 80 percent of the villagers 10 
years old or older and 54 percent of all people 
in the same age category in emirate capitalism. 
Also, only 2 percent of children age 6 through 9 
at waterpoints were enrolled in schools, while 50 
percent of children in the same age category from 
villages were in school, and 57 percent of those 
in emirate capitals were in school. (Cole, 1981, 
p. 137) 
Cole observed that the situation has not changed in edu­
cational status among the A1 Murian tribe after seven years 
since he made his first study (Cole, 1981). He concluded 
that "nomads have by far the lowest educational status of 
any sector in Saudi Arabian population and it does not seem 
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that any special efforts are being made to rectify this 
situation" (Cole, 1981, p. 138). 
At present, the only significant avenue that provides 
a special training program and potentially leads to high-
level careers in the modern sector of society is the mili­
tary (Cole, 1981). Outside of the military and security 
forces, very few Bedouin ever receive advanced training in 
a modern subject (Cole, 1981). 
The under-utilization that characterizes the domestic 
mode of production under which nomads operate does not allow 
them to produce surplus products, and their herding does not 
provide them with enough return for their basic subsistence. 
The nomad's products are consumed largely by their 
households. "Only 6 percent raise animals for selling, 
while 37.7 percent raise them for domestic use only" (Ibrahim 
and Cole, 1978, p. 21). Even those who reported raising 
animals for both domestic use and for selling, sell only 
on an irregular basis when extra cash is needed (Cole, 1981, 
p. 130). 
Of the Bedouin who engaged in agriculture, 67.8 percent 
use the products for domestic consumption, while only 3.5 
percent raised them for selling only, and 28.7 percent for 
both domestic use and selling (Ibrahim and Cole, 1978, p. 
27) . 
Because of the surplus of men in the traditional 
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household and mode of production, the Bedouin men migrate 
to cities to seek employment in a modern and semi-modern 
labor force, mostly in low-level occupations as unskilled 
labor or in desert transportation {Cole, 1981). Cole 
pointed out that "the majority of Saudi Arabians employed in 
unskilled labor are young Bedouin working to obtain money 
for such things as bridewealth or to buy a motor vehicle" 
(Cole, 1981, p. 139) . 
Most of the soldiers "in the National Guard are Bedouin 
and some serve in the police and the Army. Only a small 
handful has ever obtained high level government positions. 
There are also a few relatively well-off merchants who were 
originally Bedouin" (Cole, 1981, p. 139). 
Cole (1981, p. 146) suggests that if the economy of 
Saudi Arabia is to become significantly more modernized, the 
Bedouin who 
. . . represent a sizable proportion of the 
indigenous population—as much as 25 percent— 
and their participation in an active way and 
not just as more or less passive, parttime, 
unskilled laborers and drivers is essential. . . . 
A more diversified economy will reduce dependents 
on the export of crude oil, which is essential 
if the country is to achieve any significant 
degree of real economic and political inde­
pendence within the context of an international 
economic and political system. 
The Bedouin and other rural groups who are 
increasingly subsisting on welfare and tradi­
tional low-scale productive activities must be 
trained and incorporated into the modern economy 
and society. (Cole, 1981, p. 1460) 
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In addition to literacy, education and occupational 
status of the Bedouin which show their generally low social 
status in the contemporary Arabia, other criticism "in­
cludes housing and health conditions and practices. A vast 
majority of the Bedouin live in tents, straw huts or shacks 
that are overcrowded and lacking in water, kitchen and 
toilet facilities" (Cole, 1981, p. 140) . They suffer from 
malnutrition and anaemia and often have eye disease (Ibrahim 
and Cole, 1978}. 
The turnover among wage workers is higher than that in 
the white-collar employees in government, which indicates 
that the marginalization is more acute among the lower in­
come, menial work positions in the government. Since most 
of the low pay jobs are filled by nomads and farmers who 
were imported from the countryside, their high turnover rate 
above white collar employees in government shows clearly 
their dissatisfaction toward their jobs. 
Table 30 shows that the turnover among wage workers is 
almost four times that of white collar workers in 1977, even 
though this trend continued to be the same, but not as 
great as in 1977. This change may be due to changing 
economic conditions where alternative opportunities are 
limited, or it may be due to foreign labor's increased pro­
portion in the workforce. It is still true, however, that 
the low-income wage earners suffer from economic insecurity. 
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Table 30. Comparison between the white-collar employees 
and the wage laborers in the turnover^ 
Employment 
conditions 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
White-collar employees 
New hiring 14,539 11,945 10,641 13,020 14,967 
Resigned 3,866 3,705 3,538 1,466 1,486 
Retired 521 902 1,107 435 • 344 
Leaving service 
for other reasons 1,951 1,689 1,976 1,426 1,492 
Wage workers 
New hiring 4,916 4,619 8,846 5,998 6,534 
Resigned 4,159 3,892 4,125 1,357 1,-018 
Retired 515 1,513 1,328 1,012 532 
Leaving service 
for other reasons 2,674 2,546 2,832 1,468 1,134 
^ Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs (1981, p. 17). 
The marginali zation of rural and nomadic populations 
forced these people to migrate to urban centers to seek 
employment in low productive low wage activities. 
Farmers who left their farms seeking for humble 
jobs in the government such as door guards, 
gardeners, maintenance workers, floor cleaners, 
and the like, in return for a very low income, 
the Bedouin increasingly seek government jobs, 
and other unproductive activities. (Ahmed 
Senani, 1977, p. 10) 
Therefore, the productive sector's employment declined from 
76 percent in 1962 to around 40 percent in the 1980s, while 
the service sector inflated out of proportion two and 
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White-collar employees 
Wage Workers 
1977 1978 1979 1980 
Figure 2. Wage workers and white-collar employees who 
left the service during the years 1977-1980 
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one-half times what it had been two decades earlier. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the data confirm 
the proposition that unlike the development in the West, 
the pattern of development in peripheral countries is dis­
torted toward nonproductive activities. 
6. The hypertrophy of administrative activities 
Part of the inflated service sector can be blamed on 
the hypertrophy of administrative activities^ which is one 
of the commonplaces of "underdevelopment." In Saudi Arabia, 
the annual rate of growth of administrative services is 
averaged around 6.3 percent between 1966 and 19 76, with an 
average share of GDP of about 17.6 percent of nonoil GDP 
based on 1970 prices. The government consumption increased 
from 11.9 to 20.6 percent of the gross domestic product be­
tween 1971 and 1979. The rate of growth of government con­
sumption expenditures is 28.0 percent from 1970-1978. 
Government employment share of the total employment 
increased from 11.0 percent in 1965 to the projected 16 
percÊîit in 1984/85 (see Table 31) . 
7. Disarticulation within the national economy 
The articulated economy is where the different sectors 
of the national economy are integrated whole, 
A feature of which is a very dense flow of in­
ternal exchanges, the flow of external exchange 
of the atoms that make up this whole being, by 
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Table 31. Government share of employment (in thousands)^ 
1965° 1970^ 1975b 1980*^ Projected^ 1985 
110.4 
(11.0)® 
112.7 
(10.2) 
246.7 
(14.1) 
321.0 
(13.0) 
421.0 
(16.0) 
^Only includes civilian employees. 
^Saudi Arabian Government, Third Development Plan 
(1980-85, p. 37, 93). 
csaigh 1978, p. 140). 
"Saudi Arabian Government, Second Development Plan 
(1975-1978, p. 19). 
^Numbers in parentheses are expressed as percentages. 
and large, marginal as compared with that of 
internal exchange. In contrast to this, the 
underdeveloped economy is made up of atoms 
that are relatively juxtaposed and not inte­
grated, the density of the flow of external 
exchanges of these atoms being much greater, 
and that of the flow of internal exchanges 
very much less. (Amin, 1977a) 
Articulation and integration of an economy would produce 
spill-over effects, in the sense that any progress that 
begins at any point is spread throughout the entire organism 
by many convergent mechanisms so progress is diffused from 
industries that can be regarded as poles of development. 
If the economy is extraverted, all these effects 
are limited, being largely transferred abroad. 
Any progress realized in the oil industry will, 
for instance, be without the slightest effect 
on the economy of Kuwait, since nomad stock 
breeding sells nothing to and buys nothing from 
the oil sector. This progress will be diffused 
in the West, in all the countries that consume 
oil. (Amin, 1976b, p. 238) 
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The underdeveloped economy 
. . .  i s  m a d e  u p  o f  s e c t o r s ,  o f  f i r m s  t h a t  a r e  
juxtaposed and not highly integrated among them­
selves, but are each of them strongly integrated 
into entities. The centers of gravity of which 
lie in the centers of the capitalist world. 
(Amin, 1976b, p. 238) 
The consequence is non-structured economic spaces of 
the underdeveloped world which 
. . . can be broken up and divided into micro­
spaces without serious danger, something that 
can be done without intolerable retrogression 
in the case of the integrated space of the ad­
vanced countries. (Amin, 1976b, p. 238) 
The best way to measure disarticulation/articulation 
among sectors is through inter-industrial tables of input-
output to determine the coefficients as positive or negative. 
However, these data are not available for Saudi Arabia. 
Other measures, even though indirect, can be utilized to get 
around the deficiency in data required and can be used as an 
indicator of the phenomenon described above. 
The first indicator is the role of export and import in 
the economy, which measure the density of external exchange 
flow. This role already has been indicated in the beginning 
of this chapter, which pointed out that great role played 
by international trade in the economy. The same conclusion 
can also support the statement above. The external flow 
of exchange is so intensive that it accounts for an average 
of 19.2 percent of the GDP between 1960-1980. This intensive 
external exchange is so high that it left almost no space 
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for internal exchange among sectors. 
The second indicator mentioned earlier is the low pro­
ductivity of the agriculture sector in comparison to the 
high productivity of the oil sector; which is only .02 
percent of that of the oil sector. 
Integrated economy would diffuse development of one 
part of the economy to the other and productivity would 
not be as disintegrated as the case in point. 
The third indicator is the ratio of oil exported to 
the oil produced: 
fil pSdSced = indication of articulation . 
The higher the ratio, the less the economy is articu­
lated. 
Oil as a source of energy is a very important factor 
of industrialization and energy, and can be used as a 
measure of development and underdevelopment. (And oil as 
a productive element in an industry can point out the de­
gree of disarticulation/articulation of that economy.) In 
other words, what is the share of local market of oil con­
sumption? 
Production and export of oil in Saudi Arabia show how 
small the local market share of oil produced is. 
The average exports percentage is 97.7 percent of pro­
duction, and the local consumption accounts for only 2.3 
135 
Table 32. Oil production and export (million barrels)^ 
Year Production Export export 
^ production ~ 
1970 1,386.7 1,371.2 98.8 
1971 1,740.6 1,723.4 99.0 
1972 2,202.0 2,195.8 99.7 
1973 2,772.6 2,769.4 99.8 
1974 3,095.1 3,063.0 98.8 
1975 2,582.5 2,539.7 98.3 
1976 3,139.3 3,081.4 98.1 
1977 3,358.0 3,324.8 97.7 
1978 3,038.0 2,985.6 98.2 
1979 3,479.2 3,393.0 97.5 
1980 3,623.8 3,554.8 98.0 
Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy (1980); Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency 
Statistical Summaries (1980, 1981), Annual Report (1980). 
percent on average between 1970-1980. The greater user of 
this small percentage is not the productive sector, but 
largely the service sector. 
Table 33. Estimated energy utilization by sectors, 1979^ 
Sector % 
Transportation 32 
Utilities 29 
Oil/gas production and refining 15 
Construction 14 
Industry 4 
Residential/commercial 3 
Agriculture and other 3 
Total 100 
^Saudi Arabian Government, Third Development Plan 
(1980-1985), p. 160. 
136 
The oil sector, which is the most important one in 
terms of its income, is mainly for export and export large­
ly of crude oil (unprocessed), as indicated earlier in this 
chapter. This fact proves two things: 
(1) This high export tendency in relation to local market 
indicates the density of the flow of external exchange 
and high integration into world market rather than 
the internal market. The oil industry imports almost 
all of its needs from outside, especially the United 
States (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 1980): 
Import to oil sector 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Millions of riyals 413 1,093 1,380 4,481 
(2) The high content of oil export as crude oil (un­
processed) deprived the country from the spin-off 
effects and so indicates the low level of interaction 
with the local industrial sector. 
8. Social inequality 
Social research in Saudi Arabia is almost nonexistent, 
and reliable data describing the existing situation are nil. 
However, some data can be used as an indicator of certain 
processes. These data, even though limited, serve the pur­
pose of describing the nature of the phenomena under investi­
gation. 
There is no study or data available about income 
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distribution in Saudi Arabia, but some writers point to the 
high concentration of wealth and income in few hands. Some 
estimate that the top 5 percent of the population may con­
trol between 40-60 percent of the wealth of the nation. 
9. Urban, rural, and Bedouin income distribution 
This and the following analyses are based on a research 
conducted by a private firm on behalf of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Research. It is based on interviews with 
more than 10,000 heads of household in different locations— 
urban, rural, nomadic. Even though I have some reservation 
about the reliability and validity of this research, it is 
the only one of its kind available as far as I know. 
The average annual income of the household of the 
nomadic rural and urban population is shown in Table 34. 
Table 34. Annual average income of nomads, rural and urban 
population^ in Saudi Arabian riyals^ 
Head of the 
household 
Total income 
of household 
Nomads 11,200 14,200 
Rural 16,200 20,700 
Urban: 
Small cities 35,300 43,600 
Large cities 33,400 44,900 
Very large cities 58,000 80,400 
Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs (1978). 
^3.45 riyals = $1. 
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The average income of very large city populations is 
more than five times that of nomads and almost four times 
that of rural residents. Even in urban setting, the very 
large cities average family income is almost twice that of 
small and large cities. 
Only 26 percent of urban population receives less than 
20,000 riyals per annum, while 67 percent of the rural and 
80 percent of the nomad population receives less than 20,000. 
From the 6 percent of the total population who received 
more than 100,000, 10 percent of the urban were reported to 
receive that amount or more, while only 1 percent of both 
rural and nomad population received that much. 
Table 35. Percent of urban, rural and nomad population 
receiving the higher and lower income^ 
Less than From 21- From 51- More than 
20,000 50,000 100,000 100,000 
Urban 26 47 17 10 
Rural 67 27 5 1 
Nomad 80 18 1 1 
Total population 42 39 13 6 
^Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs (1978). 
Among urban dwellers, income distribution also differs. 
From 42 percent of the total population who are considered 
the poor or the marginal population, we find that 80 percent 
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of the nomad and 67 percent of rural are in this category. 
Table 36. Distribution of income according to city size 
Less From From More 
than 21- 51- than Total 
20,000 50,000 100,000 100,000 
Very large 
cities 18% 44% 22% 16% 100% 
Large cities 28% 52% 15% 5% 100% 
Small cities 42% 43% 12% 3% 100% 
C. Regional Distribution of Income 
Income among regions is unevenly distributed as the case 
between urban, rural and nomad. In the central region, the 
average annual income is 82,000, almost twice the average 
income of northern and southwestern regions (see Table 37. 
The poorest population is in the eastern and soutwest­
ern parts of the country. In these regions, 25 percent of 
their population's annual income is less than 17,000 riyal. 
The uneven distribution within regions is also great where 
in central, western and eastern region almost 80 percent 
of the families' income is less than the average income of 
their respective region. However, the most pronounced 
discrepancy is within the central region—25 percent re­
ported an annual income of less than 22,000 riyals and 25 
percent reported their income of higher than 70,000 riyals. 
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Table 37. Regional income distribution^ (in Saudi Arabian 
riyals) 
Annual Distribution of total ^otal 
_ . income Regions average income 
income 25% 50% 75% less 
less less less than 
than than than average 
Central 82,000 22,000 36,000 70,000 80 
Northern 45,200 18,000 32,000 47,000 73 
Western 56,400 20,000 31,000 50,000 81 
Eastern 55,150 17,000 30,500 49,000 79 
Southwestern 44,000 17,000 29,000 46,000 72 
Total 60,000 19,500 32,000 52,500 79 
^Saudi Arabia Government, Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs (1978). 
If we compare regions in the lower and higher income, 
we find the lower income brackets are in eastern and south­
eastern regions. While the higher income brackets are found 
in the central region (Table 38). The concentration of 
Table 38. Regional income distribution as a percentage of 
lower and higher groups within each region 
Less than More than 
20,000 100,000 
Central 23 15 
Northern 29 6 
Western 26 8 
Eastern 32 9 
Southwestern 32 5 
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higher income brackets in central region is in Riyad, the 
capital. 
1. Income distribution within urban population 
If we look at nomad, rural, urban as a continuum, and 
assume that nomads first settle in rural areas or small 
town then move to larger cities, we could then detect the 
pattern of migration and the origin of population. In other 
words, we can divide urban settlers into old settlers, old 
rural origin, and old nomad origin in very large, large, 
and small cities. We expect to find rural migrants to 
receive less income than older urban settlers, and nomad 
migrants to receive less than rural migrants. The most 
obvious marginalization of people would be in these groups. 
Table 39. Kinds of cities and migrant origins^ 
Kinds of cities and 
origin of the migrants 
Less 
than 
20,000 
From 
21-
50,000 
From More 
51- than 
100,000 100,000 
Total 
Old urban settlers 
in very large cities 19 43 21 17 100 
Old rural settlers 
in very large cities . 28 48 17 17 100 
Old nomadic settlers 
in very large cities 24 52 17 7 100 
Old nomadic settlers 
in large cities 33 52 11 4 100 
Small cities 42 43 12 3 100 
^Saudi Arabian Government, Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs (1978). 
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Nomads and rural migrants are reported to be in the highest 
percentage of lower income, 33 and 28 compared to 19, of 
the old urban settlers. In the higher income level, the old 
urban and old rural settlers receive each an equal share 
of their prospective group 17, while among nomads only 
small numbers are reported to receive a high income (more 
than 100,000) 1 percent in very large cities and 4 percent 
of them in large cities. 
2. Conclusion 
From the above discussion, we noted that an uneven 
distribution of income existed between nomads and urban, 
and rural and urban, between regions, and also within urban 
population. We noted also that the poorest of the poor can 
be found in nomadic and rural areas, also in eastern and 
southwestern regions. In urban centers, the poorest are in 
the small cities which are mainly populated by rural and 
Bedouin settlers. In the large cities, nomadic origin and 
to a lesser extent rural origin comprise much of the poor in 
the cities. 
D. Distribution of Income in Largest City 
In Riyad, the capital of Saudi Arabia and the largest 
g 
city in the country (see above section), the study pointed 
^This analysis is based on a study done in 1978 by C. T. 
International in contract with Ministry of Urban and Rural 
Affairs, Department of Urban Planning. 
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out that a strong correlation was found between income and 
place of residence. Income influenced by type of occupa­
tion, status of settlers; urban, rural or nomadic origin. 
Rural and Bedouin who migrated to the cities lack the skill 
for urban life and jobs, so they end up working in low-pay-
ing, low-productive jobs. The shanty towns on the outskirts 
of the city are populated mostly by these people. 
It is also interesting to note that the pre-capitalist 
relation such as tribal bond and extended family was broken 
down in the cities. As the study indicated that class 
relation became more pronounced than before. Class stratif­
ication can be seen in location and type of residency, 
pattern of consumption, occupational status and power. Class 
division is becoming rigid. Social mobility range is limited 
in the top, is exclusive, while in the middle it is more 
flexible. Commenting on the way wealth is distributed, one 
report points out that 
There are important precapitalist features to the 
way wealth is distributed in Saudi Arabia. The 
most impoverished in Saudi society are the 
Bedouins (settled or nomadic). The non-Saudis 
(especially Yemanis), and the Saudis who have no 
access to the ruling clan—no family ties, no 
community of faith, no ancient nobility capable 
of selling it support. Although the present phase 
of development encourages an increasing amount of 
mobility, individual success stories still tend 
to be exaggerations. Oil reserves remain in the 
hands of the state or to be more precise, in the 
hands of influential members of the royal family. 
It is only important when families have in­
filtrated the state structure and established 
intimate relations at the highest level. Thanks 
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to a system of sponsorship and partnership, this 
comprador bourgeoise profitability concentrates 
on mixed industrial projects with the state, on 
franchises for the most powerful Western firms, 
and more recently, on large public works and 
consulting projects. This symbiosis of the tra­
ditional power and the urban bourgeoisie flour­
ishes and persists and is reciprocal. 
It has led to a bourgeoisification of the 
royal family through an increasingly open involve­
ment of the princes in business. . . . This sort 
of transformation is limited to a small circle, 
difficult to enter for persons outside the royal 
family, its close allies or the traditional 
merchant families. The population as a whole 
. . . increasingly feels the effects of concen­
tration of wealth as an extension of the con­
centration of power. Neither underdevelopment nor 
tribalism, nor hegemonic religious superstructure 
can slow down or even camouflage the rapid emergence 
of increasingly distinct social changes. (MERIP, 
1980, p. 18) 
The concentration of income can be seen from Table 40 
where the bottom 5 percent of the residents or the poorest 
of the poor received only 0.5 percent of the total income 
resource from 0 to 10,000 riyals a year, while the top 2.7 
percent of the residents received approximately 25 percent 
of the income. The lower half of the total residents, 
the lowest 50 percent, are reported to have received only 
18 percent of the total income, while 62 percent of the 
total income went to only 25 percent of the total residents. 
Time and time again, I have pointed out the lack of 
accurate and reliable data which cover the whole population 
of Saudi Arabia as far as income distribution is concerned. 
However, the limited data which I have access to did not in­
clude the top of the pyramid but can give some idea of the 
145 
100 
m 
-P 
G 
0) 
•H 
CO 
M 
20 40 70 10 50 60 80 90 100 30 
Income 
(thousands of S.A. riyals) 
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residents (percent) 
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Table 40. Income and residents distribution 
Residents Income resources 
Income No, of p _ Percent Percent 
(riyals)^ resi- accumu- Amount % accumu-
dents lation lation 
0-5,000 1,314 1. 4 1. 4 2,061 04 04 
6-10,000 3,462 3. 6 5. 0 28,177 * 52 52 
11-20,000 16,633 17. 5 22. 5 256,092 4. 73 5. 29 
21-30,000 20,831 21. 9 44. 4 532,842 9. 83 15. 12 
31-40,000 12,305 12. 9 57. 3 437,124 8. 07 23. 19 
41-50,000 10,357 10. 9 68. 2 464,194 8. 57 31. 76 
51-75,000 14,741 15. 5 83. 7 906,003 16. 72 48. 48 
76-100,000 6,115 6. 4 90. 1 527,233 9. 73 58. 21 
101-150,000 5,121 5. 4 95. 5 613,136 11. 31 69. 52 
151-200,000 1,768 1. 8 97. 3 306,259 5. 64 75. 16 
More than 
200,000 2,645 2. 7 100. 0 1,346,437 24. 84 100. 00 
Total 95,292 100. 0 — 5,419,559 100. 00 
^U.S. $ = 3.48 in the current exchange rate. 
pattern of distribution in what I call the less rigid range. 
In almost all industrialized countries, the lowest 20 per­
cent of the population received between 4 to 7 percent of 
the income, while the top 5 percent of the population re­
ceived between 15 to 20 percent (see Table 41). 
According to Table 41, the lowest 20 percent of the 
residents receive approximately 4 percent of the income, 
while the top 5 percent may receive between 33 to 35 percent 
of the income. However, if the study included the top of 
the population's pyramid, the distribution would be very 
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Table 41. Income distribution by the lowest 20 and highest 
5 percent in some industrialized countries, 
1960, 1976^ 
1960 1976 
Lowest Highest Lowest Highest 
20 4 20 5 
United States 4 16 7 13 
United Kingdom 6 16 6 15 
Germany 5 36 6 18 
Japan 5 20 4 20 
Sweden 4 18 5 17 
1977 
Lowest Highest 
20 5 
Saudi Arabia 4 45-60 
^Issawi (1982, p. 232); Kriesberg (1979, p. 65). 
central between 45 to as much as 60 percent of the total 
income. 
1. Contemporary social formation 
Class development in pure capitalist mode of production 
has been characterized by polarization of social classes 
into two basic classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletari­
ate. But this model cannot be applied to peripheral socie­
ties. That process happened only in the center where capi­
talist mode became exclusive, because it is based on expan­
sion and deepening of the home market, which leads to 
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9 growing homogeneity. 
Capitalism in the periphery operates with a different 
dynamic, since capitalist mode of production penetrated pre­
capitalist society from outside and was based on the ex­
ternal market. It tends not to become exclusive, only 
dominant. Therefore, social formation in the periphery is 
a mixture of both capitalist and noncapitalist elements 
and that made their formation heterogeneous. The existence 
of pre-capitalist mode, along with the dominant capitalist 
mode of production, does not mean mere juxtaposition, but 
these modes integrated into the system occupying the lower 
level of the hierarchy. The subsistence farmers and the 
subsistence nomadic pastoralists are forced to produce with­
in his pre-capitalist setting commodities for the market in 
order to earn cash money to get their needs from the market. 
Before the integration into the world system, the dominant 
mode was tribute-paying mode which existed with primitive 
and simple commodity mode. The relation among these modes 
and between them and outside was through trade formation 
which, as pointed out earlier, played an important role in 
9 
The dialectic of social class in the capitalist mode 
is the obj ective..social opposition between the expropriation 
of surplus value produced by labor, and the laborer himself. 
The development of the capitalist mode is thus dependent on 
the rate of exploitation of labor. The relation between 
surplus value and the level of development of productive 
forces is positive. 
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shaping the history of this region. The means of production 
was commonly owned by the whole tribe: the water wells, 
the pastoral range, and sometimes the herds also, but often 
every section or extended families within the tribe owned 
theirs. In settled areas, farm lands usually were owned 
by the extended families, and sometimes the whole area was 
settled by one tribe or its sections. Relationships between 
one tribe and another, or between tribes and settled areas, 
or between some settled areas allied with some tribes against 
other alienment based on strength. The most powerful side 
would force the weaker one to pay tribute. After integra­
tion into the world economy, the traditional power structure 
base was transformed and new camprador and petty bourgeoisie 
came to the scene. 
From a pre-capitalist society half a century ago, 
Saudi Arabia is now rapidly developing into a 
class society within the limits imposed by its 
economy based on the export of oil. Its ruling 
class is primarily of the royal family, and is 
slowly being penetrated by the local bourgeoisie 
involved in trade and to a minimal extent in 
industry. The indigenous population is increas­
ingly composed of a substantial group of techno­
crats and office employees, while it includes al­
most no working class. The vast majority of people 
engaged in manual labor in construction and mini­
mally in industry are migrant workers. The only 
really poor section of the native community are 
the peasants and nomads who have been unable to 
capitalize their activities and whose economic 
base is in decline. (Lackner, 1978, p. 211) 
The articulation of social forces within the nation in terms 
of the capitalist dialectic is still fragmented. In other 
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words, the ideological instance rather than economic in­
stance which articulate and reproduce the conditions for 
the functioning of society. 
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V. IMPLICATION FOR THE THEORY AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
In the sociology of development and social change, the 
perspective of modernization and its model incorporate and 
adopt issues and concepts elaborated by the founding fathers 
of sociology concerning the themes of social change, evolu­
tion and progress. This perspective can be witnessed in 
the structural-functionalist school which include Bellah, 
Parsons, Eisenstadt, Smelser, Moore and others. In this 
sense, the definition of modernization is the process of 
change toward a condition of modernity with the "candid use 
of Western modernization as a model of global applicability" 
(Bendix, 1967, p. 309). The social entity undergoing modern­
ization may be society, economy, politics or culture. On a 
different level of analysis, the unit of analysis may be 
individual as in the theories of "modern man." Categories 
of modernization can also be applied to the study of a partic­
ular social and institutional unit such as the family, the 
city, the village, education, bureaucracy, military, and so 
on. 
The social content of modernity is formulated according 
to the categories through which Western Europe and North 
America experienced their history; this is reflected upon 
and appropriated in sociological theory. Eisenstadt claims 
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that 
Historically, modernization is the process of 
change toward those types of social, economic, 
and political systems that have developed in 
Western Europe and North America from the seven­
teenth century to the nineteenth and have then 
spread to other European countries and in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South 
American, Asian and African continents. 
(Eisenstadt, 1966, p. 1) 
Weiner asserts that social scientists use the term 
"modernization" 
. . . not only because it is a part of popular 
speech, but also because they" recognize that 
these many changes (individual attitudes, in 
social behavior, in economics, and in politics) 
are related to one another—that many countries 
in the developing world today are experiencing 
a comprehensive process of change which Europe 
and America once experienced and which are more 
than the sum of many small changes. (Preface 
to Weiner, 1966) 
Theories of modernization see the social change in de­
veloping nation as a departure from nonmodern (traditional) 
societies to a distinctiveness of modernity. A process 
through which cumulative development of elements of modern­
ity displaces nonmodern elements. This in essence implies 
the use of certain abstracts from a historical process that 
have already been realized in the West, to be used as a 
model or a frame of reference for underdeveloped countries 
to follow suit, and to arrive at the prescribed destination. 
However, if the underdeveloped countries fail to achieve 
that, the answer is assumed to be a deviation from the norm. 
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This deviation is described as an obstacle to development. 
These abstracts might be in the traditional culture (e.g., 
the moral basis of backward society as seen by Banfield, 
1958), the culture of poverty .(Oscar Lewis, 1965), peasant 
society and the image of limited good (G. Foster, 1965) or 
because underdeveloped countries lack entrepreneurs who can 
carry on the course of development as such that of Western 
individuals influenced by "protestant ethic" (e.g., Everett 
Hagen, on the theory of social change, 1962; McClelland et al. 
motivating economic achievement, 1969; Inkles and Smith, 
becoming modern, 1974). The assumption these writers and 
others reflect is that the underdeveloped countries short­
fall from the Western experience is merely as a deviant one. 
The modernization approach to development also neglects 
the interrelationships among nations and their impact on the 
internal structure. It fails to provide a framework for 
understanding the insertion of individual countries in an 
evolving international system. When they talk about inter-
societal exchange and the consequence of this exchange, 
they have room for only the adoption and diffusion process 
from advanced to less developed countries, and it it gener­
ally assumed that what is diffused is good for underdeveloped 
countries. 
The development and social change based on moderniza­
tion theory and models pose a lot of problems in applying 
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them to underdeveloped countries: First, there is the 
limitations of the passage from a European-centered theory 
of change into a theory of contemporary development. This 
is reflected in identifying the wrong dimensions as indica­
tors of or strategies for development. Second, the 
scholars have overlooked their own ideological commitments 
and ethnocentrical attitudes. Third, they neglected the 
supranational dynamism of an organized world-economy and 
its distinctive core and peripheral economic region. Final­
ly, 
The dualism established by the conceptual couple, 
modernity-tradition, embodies a circularity which 
can't produce any theoretical advanced, any 
explanation other than that already given by defi­
nition of the terms. Concrete analysis consists 
of the accretion of facts around these terms and 
their derivations. (.Bernstein, 1979, p. 93) 
The world system perspective includes dependency as an 
alternative to the previous one, seeking to explain the 
international relations of inequality and external mechanisms 
that induced and perpetuated a situation of domination and 
dependence. It identifies the historical process of under­
development and the capital expropriation, asymmetrical 
exchange, interpretation of division of labor—unequal de­
velopment of productive forces. The objective of this 
perspective is more appropriate to the realities of under­
developed countries, and unlike modernization theories, this 
perspective sees underdevelopment as an active process rather 
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than a passive or residual condition. 
Amin, as well as other world system theorists, pointed 
to the fact that there is only one world system which is 
the capitalist world system, which consists of two parts : 
center and periphery. The peripheral capitalism operates 
by a different dynamics than capitalism in the developed 
industrial nations, and the link between them defines the 
structural dynamics of dependency. Relations between center 
and periphery is characterized by unequal exchange. The 
structural features of a peripheral capitalist development 
depicted in Amin's model as being; (a) progressively sub­
ordinating all sectors of the socioeconomic infrastructure 
to the demands of a limited primary commodity export economy; 
(b) dependence of the productive sector upon the importa­
tion of Western technologies; (c) dependence of internal 
market on the importation of essential consumer goods ; 
(d) marginalization of labor; (e) low levels of employment 
in the productive economic sector; (f) rapid growth of the 
tertiary sector; (g) increasing concentration of wealth and 
power; and (h) unequal regional and sectoral development. 
By applying the Amin model of peripheral development to 
"Saudi Arabia, we first try to substantiate Amin's claims 
that all underdeveloped countries consist of a homogeneous 
entity characterized by similar features of peripheral capi­
talist process. Second, also related to the first, is 
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whether his model is relevant to the study of the capital 
surplus country. Saudi Arabia is a single-resource depend­
ent, capital-surplus nation—unlike that of other under­
developed countries which suffer from the shortage of capi­
tal. It is in this sense that Saudi Arabia occupies an 
anomalous position in terms of theories of development, 
underdevelopment and dependency. 
The case study of Saudi Arabia suggests that it exhibits 
the same syndromes of underdevelopment as seen in other 
peripheral countries, which have been put forward by Amin's 
theories. In other words, the data of this study support 
Amin's model of peripheral capitalist development in spite 
of its capital surplus generated from oil export. Saudi 
Arabia shares the same structural features of dependence as 
those countries suffering capital shortage. This study indi­
cates that capital shortage is not the main cause of under­
development, but rather the class structure that prohibited 
autonomous capitalist development. 
As far as the theory is concerned, the Saudi Arabian 
case study gives further testimony to the credibility of 
Amin's theory to provide understanding, explanation and pre­
diction to underdevelopment. The theory identifies the 
causes and consequences of certain processes, and in a 
fashion, conforms to the scientific inquiry. As far as the 
form of development that has occurred in Saudi Arabia, it 
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is specified by its narrow specialized role in the world 
division of labor, as an oil exporter, and its reciprocal 
role as an expropriator of capital to the industrialized 
world. 
In conclusion, theories of social change and develop­
ment based on the traditional modernization model cannot 
offer a good explanation to the historical process of under­
developed countries. Even though the world system and de­
pendency approach may have certain shortcomings, it never­
theless offers better explanation to this special case. 
This is so because the theorists see development/underde­
velopment as two sides of the same historical process. The 
imperialist relation of power imposed a limiting role to 
those who become underdeveloped. 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Two central issues in the sociology of economic develop­
ment and change: one is why and how some countries have 
developed and others have not. The other is whether con­
temporary underdeveloped countries are in a backward stage 
of the same process already passed by now developed in­
dustrialized countries of the West. In other words, do the 
underdeveloped countri -es represent the image of the now 
developed countries some two centuries ago, or do they repre­
sent special dynamics of their own that is far different 
from historical process of the West. 
Literature dealing with these issues is divided into 
two approaches: one is the traditional, which was once the 
main stream in the sociology of development. That is, the 
modernization theories. The other one which recently gained 
a respected position in sociology is the world-system de­
pendency theory. 
The first approach sees underdeveloped countries as in 
a stage in the traditional-modernity continuum, similar to 
the same process Western industrialized countries went 
through. A great deal of criticism had been launched at 
this perspective. As noted by Portes (1974, p. 55), one 
major reason for this criticism is the gap between theoreti­
cal perspectives and the concrete historical experiences of 
countries in the underdeveloped world. Also criticized is 
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the neglect of external causes and its consequences. 
Scholars in this camp tended to concentrate instead on in­
ternal forces of the society, assuming that each society 
is basically independent of all others. These problems and 
others render this perspective unusable for explaining 
change or continuity in the underdeveloped countries. 
The other perspective was born as a response to the 
shortcoming of the traditional approach, and came mostly out 
of underdeveloped countries themselves. Even though criti­
cized for its concentration on external linkage at the ex­
penses of the internal process of change, and for its 
ideological overtone, it is, however, close to the reality 
of underdeveloped countries and is providing a promising 
explanation of the phenomenon of underdevelopment. The 
world system/dependency theorists give more global view of 
the problem of underdevelopment. They see causal relation­
ships between the pattern of evolution for developed, 
industrialized society and the underdevelopment of third 
world nations. To them, development and underdevelopment 
are not two stages in the history of mankind but as two 
facets of the capitalist world system. Underdevelopment is 
to a large extent the result of the subordinate position in 
international network characterized by relations of inequali­
ty. The developed countries never were underdeveloped. 
They were undeveloped. Underdevelopment in the 
160 
underdeveloped countries was caused by their integration 
into this world system to be only in the periphery to the 
center of gravity in the industrialized world. Contemporary 
world capitalism constitutes a historically developed inter­
national mode of production, not a national mode, and the 
capitalist class has evolved through historical development 
into a world class, not a national class. The integration 
into the world capitalist system of the dominant class of 
the periphery transformed the basis of class power. In 
other words, the underdeveloped countries lack the independ­
ent, genuine national bourgeoisie, or industrialist who 
brought about the industrial revolution in the West. Tradi­
tional merchants and agrarian feudalist were transformed to 
become dependent agrarian capitalist or a comprador type of 
bourgeoisie through the integration process. It is inter­
esting to note that the two approaches agree on one aspect of 
underdevelopment, they disagree on the source of that aspect. 
While some traditional modernization theory sees under­
development in the lack of entrepreneurs who were motivated, 
rational, risk taking, and were committed to accumulate and 
invest and so on, the other approach sees the problem of 
national development in the Third World coming from the 
dependent subordination of the capitalist class in these 
countries. 
Given the argument made by the two perspectives, I have . 
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selected Amin's theory as a representative of the world 
system/dependency school of thought for three reasons; 
(1) Amin integrated and incorporated much of the arguments 
of this school in his theory which made his theory, 
as some writers indicated, represent the maturity of 
the entire school (Aidan Foster-Carter, 1982). 
(2) Amin, unlike other theorists of this perspective, 
offers an elaborate model of thç structural features 
of peripheral developments which examine and explain 
the production structures and resultant class relations. 
(3) Amin's critics mostly concentrate on his method of us­
ing Marxian categories or his political strategy etc., 
but few examined empirically his model to see whether 
it is in accordance with reality in the underdeveloped 
countries. 
The evidence presented in the case study of Saudi Arabia 
suggests that Amin is correct in almost all aspects of his 
approach. 
The penetration of modern capitalism into pre-capitalist 
society induced its integration into the world division of 
labor. This integration took the form of narrow specializa­
tion of productive force and unequal development. Special­
ization limits increasing productivity across economic sec­
tors and diversification of productive labor. The unique 
case of Saudi Arabia as a capital-rich country does not 
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prevent it from exhibiting the same syndrome of underdevelop­
ment present in other dependent nations which are generally 
suffering from capital shortage. The structure of develop­
ment in Saudi Arabia insures the recirculation of capital 
accumulated through oil exploitation back into the central 
capitalist system. Expansion of the structure of expropri­
ation, rather than the expansion of production, is the form 
of exploitation taking place. As a result, the development 
of productive forces is limited, and the productive labor is 
being marginalized. 
A. Recommendations 
Most of dependency writers, including Amin, doubt the 
possibility of an autonomous capitalist development in the 
periphery within the existing world system. The choice is 
"either dependent development or autocentric development, 
necessarily original in form as opposed to that of present-
day developed countries" (Amin, 1976a). In other words, they 
see two choices: either to continue the dependent develop­
ment under the conditions of inequality between nations, 
or to break up with the world capitalist system and estab­
lish a development policy not based on capitalist model of 
resources allocation, and reject the rules of profitability 
and consumption pattern. 
Why is autonomous capitalist development like that of 
the developed countries not accessible in the periphery? In 
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the dependency literature, the answer mostly given is on 
the historic incapacity of the comprador or dependent 
bourgeoisies to carry through the national development like 
that initiated by the industrial bourgeoisies in the in­
dustrialized West. Another reason given is the relation­
ship of dependency continuing to be reproduced in many 
aspects, such as the flow of capital out of the nation, and 
other features of social structures resulting from the ob­
jective class relations within a dependent society, which is 
in turn the product of the integration in the international 
division of labor. The role of the peripheral bourgeoisie 
class is merely accumulation and expropriation to the center 
of the world system, rather than the production of value. 
One writer described the local bourgeoisies as guided 
by 
. . . immediate profitability, which is greater 
in trade. This group is not concerned with 
primitive capital accumulation, a process which 
is considered by many economists to be an essen­
tial beginning to the development of balanced 
economy. Immediate profitability suggests in­
vestments abroad, or in speculation and trade, 
none of which contribute to productive capacity 
of the national economy. . . . The trend towards 
commercial capitalism is a result of the particu­
lar circumstances of Saudi Arabia's economic 
transformation: The country is not transforming 
its mode of production through its own process of 
industrialization and the internal development of 
its own natural resources. On the contrary, its 
natural resources, primarily oil, are being ex­
tracted and exported in an unprocessed condition, 
and the "development" of the country is taking 
place as a side-effect of the income derived by 
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the Saudi Arabian state from the export of oil, 
therefore, the main source of capital derives 
from the state's conscious policy of setting up 
a private sector and its diversion of substan­
tial amounts of its income to private business. 
This takes place mainly in the import business 
and in the payment of "commissions" to middle­
men, and in the long run may be aimed at creating 
a class of wealthy business people dependent on 
the reign for their continued prosperity. 
(Lackner, 1978, p. 146) 
The same writer also noted that "the importance of trade in 
the economy has meant that many people restrict their activi­
ties to receiving agent's fees and commissions on imported 
goods without actively participating in the business" 
(Lackner, 1978, p. 171). The reason why Saudi bourgeoisies 
have not been very keen on productive industrialization can 
then root on the facts that 
They can make far higher profits much faster by 
investing in trade, specifically in the import 
business, or in real estate and housing, where 
cost and profits have been soaring, . . . foreign 
competition has meant that most local products 
are unlikely to be competitive especially since 
there is no tradition of industry. (Lackner, 
1978, p. 161) 
The traditional merchants, as was noted in the introduction, 
benefitted from the post-oil era, and many of them expanded 
and diversified their trade activities in imports of commodi­
ties. However, the growth of a new class of compradors 
has an international status. Saad Eddin Ibrahim described 
this class as "the cultural broker, who represents the multi­
national and has connections within the bureaucracy and has 
connections within the bureaucracy and access to information 
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about government projects, etc.(Ibrahim, 1982, p. 30). 
Real-estate business and land speculation was the 
business of fast and easy profit, especially from 1974 to 
1979 as a result of government's development expenditure. 
On construction programs, the land prices soared very quick­
ly, and huge sums of money poured into the pockets of few. 
As many pointed out, billions of dollars were circulated 
in nonproductive activities where the prices inflated every 
time the land was sold, as well as the concentration of capi­
tal in the hands of people who did not have the tradition of 
entrepreneurship, of creativity, of risk-taking, of industry, 
etc. Instead, they were the kind of people who spent on con­
spicuous consumption, including luxury goods and services to 
enhance their social status. 
In short, the arguments put forward by dependency per­
spective of why autonomous development is blocked in under­
developed countries can be summaried in three points; 
(1) The outflow of capital from underdeveloped coun­
tries as profits of multinational corporation, 
price paid for technology and imported goods and 
services through unequal exchange etc. would de­
prive the country of the multiplier mechanism. 
lln a recent case study of Iran using the two approach­
es, Mahmoud Nofallah (1982) found that almost in all aspects 
the modernization models of development failed to explain 
what has happened in Iran since 1940, while the world sys­
tem/dependency model offers an accurate picture of the 
events in Iran. 
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(2) The narrow range of productive activity, which 
is the consequence of international specializa­
tion, would limit development process. 
(3) The economic growth which is based on external 
demand rather than expanding the domestic market, 
even though it may reflect increase in GNP in 
the short run. But it does not mean development. 
Given the above argument, it does suggest that develop­
ment can be achieved without limiting the alternatives to 
those pointed out by Amin. 
Among the recommendations that would be suggested to 
help in bringing about a more balanced and more self-oriented 
development are: 
(1) Expansion and diversification of the productive 
base of the economy by large-scale organized in­
vestment in industry and agriculture. 
(a) In agriculture, the family farms should 
be maintained and preserved, for the farming is 
a way of life and it is the only work they could 
do well. But recently, many of them left their 
farms due to the competition from imported agri­
cultural products, or inability to invest in their 
farm because of low return. They leave the farm 
to go to urban areas where they seek jobs in non­
productive activities; as pointed out, they are 
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not equipped to do the urban kind of jobs. The 
over-urbanization and the increase in imported 
foodstuffs are in some way the cause of outward 
migration from the rural areas. The government 
should extend loans and invest in transportation 
facilities, storage, irrigation, research, and 
seeds. The price structure should be in the bene­
fit of farmers, not the middle man or the urban 
dwellers. The government should establish an 
agricultural bank and a program for land distribu­
tion. In the past, these practices had benefitted 
not the fanners, but mostly people who are not 
interested in farming, but in profit and the land 
itself. These absentee new land owners import 
labor and use imported capital intensive technology 
which may not be appropriate to the local condi­
tions. The high cost of production exceeds the 
cost of imported agricultural products. 
The implication of the new policy will in­
tensify the concentration of land ownership and 
the elimination of traditional small peasantry. 
As one writer noted. 
Development is interpreted as the intro­
duction of agribusiness and the opportun­
ity for some to make large profits, rather 
than in terms of developing the country's 
ability to be self-sufficient and rely on 
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its own resources. The government's 
model for agriculture development is 
based on the experience of a number of 
model farms which were set up in the 
country, and are mainly operated under 
the supervision and with the advice of 
Western experts. (Lackner, 1978, p. 185) 
(b) Industry: The small share of industrial 
production in the GDP explains the primitive stage 
of industrialization in Saudi Arabia. The two 
kinds of industries in existence or being planned 
for Saudi Arabia are heavy industry and light in­
dustry; heavy industry involves mainly the govern­
ment in joint ventures with multinational corpora­
tions. It is in the oil-related industry such as 
petrochemical projects or gas-gathering schemes. 
These industries are geared mostly toward external 
markets based on cheap natural resources. 
Light industry is mostly in the food processing 
or building related industry and luxury goods pro­
duction. Capital goods and consumer goods are all 
imported. Technological dependence is another form 
of dependence which not only drains the local capi­
tal, but also makes it necessary to import foreign 
skilled labor to operate and maintain local 
industries. 
Any genuine industrial development must be geared toward 
mass consumption, and to create the kind of industries 
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based on local resources to minimize imports. The integra­
tion of industries that would use the inputs of local re­
sources and a local industry would stimulate a chain effect 
toward more economic development. This must be accompanied 
by restrictions against competitive imports. 
1. Balanced development 
Underdeveloped countries often are characterized by the 
existence of primate cities where the bulk of public and 
private funds are spent, and the specialization in one or 
two export activities which are usually highly advanced, 
while the rest of the economy is backward. 
To achieve balanced development, development programs 
must extend across all the regions and all sectors of the 
economy, regardless of profitability. The inequality of 
income among regions and between sectors resulted from con­
centration of investment in some regions and some sectors. 
One of the goals of development is to strengthen socio­
political and economic integration. This can be effective­
ly achieved through equal distribution of funds, projects, 
and economic programs as well as social development. The 
quality and quantity of education y health and other social 
services should not be limited to urban areas, but must be 
expanded to rural areas as well. There are no studies about 
the social mobility difference between rural and urban 
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individuals, but observations indicated that upward mobility 
in education, occupations, etc. is more restricted for 
individuals who have a rural background. 
High death rate, illiteracy, low income, low productiv­
ity, and unemployment are all higher in rural and nomadic 
communities. The government's efforts to create social and 
human services facilities (in education, health, etc.) in 
rural areas have been often undercut by the less than quali­
fied personnel who are unwilling to work in rural areas. 
The better qualified and better paid prefer urban centers. 
Many rural communities have lost their agricultural 
role and become consumers of imported goods and increasingly 
dependent on the government to sustain their livelihood in 
an unproductive way. Creation'of industries based on local 
materials and resuscitation of agricultural activities would 
help the country to become self-sufficient, or at least 
less dependent on imported goods. 
2. Basic needs 
Saudi Arabia has increasingly become the dumping market 
for the industrialized countries, as the capital surplus 
situation expands over-consumption of imported goods rather 
than production of value. Under this trend, social and 
human development is conceived in terms of consumerism and 
measured by gross consumption indices. Over-consumption 
not only produces waste but also destroys the cultural values 
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of the society. The imported western consumption behavior 
and taste destroyed many local products and a style of liv­
ing. The idea of basic needs means a balance of living 
without waste, and instead of spending the surplus income 
on luxury goods (building of luxury villas, fancy cars, 
etc.), spend on useful ends that are more productive and 
more meaningful. 
3. Appropriate technology 
The technology that would increase labor productivity 
and demand a lower rate of human as well as environmental 
cost is certainly a desirable technology. But it is true 
that Western technology cannot always be appropriate to 
underdeveloped countries. Many studies pointed to the 
disastrous results produced from the application of imported 
technology. Technology is not value-free. When a country 
imports technology, it imports its value as well. Some 
capital-rich countries can buy whole-sum industries and 
factories, implant them in their countries, and import 
foreign labor to operate them without realizing the socio­
economic consequences. The choice of and transfer of tech­
nology should be in the interest of the community as a whole. 
Local research programs would be the best way to develop 
the kind of technology that is based on local resources and 
is appropriate for the needs of a community. 
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